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Second Meeting of SEATO Council

COMMUNIQUE OF MARCH 8

Press release 130 dated March 9

The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization today concluded its second meeting, held in Karachi from March 6 to March 8 under the chairmanship of Mr. Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Council members reaffirmed their governments' support for the United Nations and their continued intention to conduct their policies in accordance with the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Council also reaffirmed the dedication of the member governments to the objectives of the Treaty and of the Pacific Charter: To strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom; to coordinate efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security; to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities; to promote higher living standards, economic progress, and social well-being; and to prevent any counter attempts to subvert freedom or to destroy sovereignty or territorial integrity. The Council reviewed progress made toward these objectives in the 18 months since the Treaty was signed in Manila¹ and especially in the year since the Council held its first meeting at Bangkok.²

The Council agreed that the Treaty and the progress of the Treaty organization have made a

notable contribution to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific and have helped to deter armed aggression in the Treaty area. The Council hoped that the use of force would continue to be avoided in the settlement of international disputes and that particular disputes would be resolved amicably if peace was maintained. It recognized the necessity, however, of creating and maintaining powerful deterrents against aggression lest potential aggressors come to believe that aggression would not be effectively and immediately resisted. The Council members severally affirmed that their countries will never commit aggression and that their cooperation under this treaty is directed toward mutual defense and the maintenance of peace.

The members of the Council noted with satisfaction the healthy political developments of the past year within the Treaty area. They noted that talks with the delegation from Singapore were to take place in London in April and expressed their deep interest in the outcome of discussions of such importance to the SEATO area. They welcomed reports of the steps taken toward establishing full self-government and independence for Malaya within the Commonwealth. They noted the further progress in development of free political institutions in the region and particularly the further development of representative governments in the countries referred to in the Protocol to the Treaty, Cambodia, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam.

The Council agreed that steady economic progress had been achieved among the members and in Cambodia, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam. It was noted that assistance from the members had contributed markedly to this desirable development.

The Council agreed that there had been useful progress in cooperation among member governments in assisting each other to combat subversive activities. They observed that communist tactics

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371. For the text of the first annual report of the Council Representatives, released on Mar. 1, 1956, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.

were placing increasing reliance on methods of political and economic infiltration. They noted, however, that this shift in tactics was unaccompanied by any convincing evidence of intent to abandon efforts to subvert, weaken and overthrow the political, economic and social systems which have been freely chosen by the peoples of the area. The Council attributed in large measure this seeming shift in tactics away from violence in some parts of the world to the collective security arrangements of the free nations.

They particularly deplored statements and interventions by Soviet leaders in recent months designed to increase tension and promote division in the Asian communities and among other nations of the free world. Insofar as these statements referred to "Pushtunistan" the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it was consequently affirmed that the Treaty area referred to in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty includes the area up to that line.

Insofar as these statements concerned Kashmir, the members of the Council noting that the United Nations resolutions remain in force, affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiations.

Assisted by reports from the Council Representatives in Bangkok, from the various committees under the Council Representatives, and from the Military Advisers, the Council reviewed in detail the steps taken by member governments individually and collectively to carry out the Articles of the Treaty.

The Council reviewed steps taken by member governments under Article II to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent any counter subversive activities directed from without". They found that the defense forces of the member nations in Asia have been appreciably improved since the signing of the Treaty and are better equipped and deployed to act in an emergency. Member governments have assisted one another on an increasing scale in the training and equipping of these forces. Through its Military Advisers, SEATO has made a good beginning in planning for the coordinated use of these forces in collective

self-defense. During the year a number of joint military exercises by some of the SEATO powers were held, including the "Firm Link" combined land, sea and air exercises held in and around Bangkok on February 15 to 18. These exercises pointed the way to further cooperative efforts for the common defense.

The Council welcomed the progress recorded in the past year in reducing the dangers posed to the territorial integrity and political stability of the area by subversive activities directed from without. In considering the continuing threat the Council noted that the members concerned have significantly improved the quality of their security forces, and have developed other measures to reduce threats to democratic government and social progress. The SEATO Governments have initiated a number of mutual assistance programs in this field, and the Organization's Committee of Security Experts has provided an increasingly useful forum for cooperation in defense against such subversive activities.

The Council reviewed steps taken under Article III to cooperate "in the further development of economic measures . . . to promote economic progress and social well-being". They considered this a most important objective of the Treaty recognizing that economic and social welfare is essential to healthy political life. They were gratified to note the steady progress already made in promoting the economic development of the Treaty area and emphasized the urgency of this problem. They noted the measures of economic assistance to countries of the area undertaken by member governments in addition to the very considerable expenditures under aid programs for increasing the defensive capacity of the region.

They particularly welcomed the fact that U.S. allocations for economic aid to Asian SEATO members have increased in total almost four-fold in the two fiscal years since the Treaty was signed. The Council members, while convinced of the necessity of adequate defense programs and cooperation to preserve the national independence and cultural traditions of their countries, are equally determined to press forward with national and international programs to raise standards of living in the Treaty area which they consider basic to national security.

The Council approved measures to strengthen the Organization and facilitate the Council Rep-

representatives' plan of work for the coming year.

They approved the plans of the Committee of Economic Experts, working under the Council Representatives, to continue their studies of the economic problems involved in Treaty commitments and to undertake new studies. They invited the Council Representatives to pursue the study of the concrete problems resulting from the defense effort of member states as well as those existing in areas particularly susceptible to subversive activities.

They noted and approved the intention of the Council Representatives, within the terms of their existing directives, to give a high priority in the coming year to regional cooperation and, where appropriate, joint action by the member governments in the field of countering subversive activities.

The Council considered the work of the Military Advisers which would result in further developing the effectiveness of the machinery for defense cooperation. The members considered the conclusions of the Military Advisers as to the defensive forces that would be required to meet aggression, and agreed on the desirability of maintaining certain of their military forces at levels of mobility and combat effectiveness which would be an effective deterrent to aggression.

The following organizational decisions were taken:

(A) To assist the Council Representatives and to provide a stronger central SEATO organization in Bangkok, the Council authorized the establishment of a permanent working group composed of an officer from the staff of each Council Representative, and the establishment of a full-time Executive Secretariat to replace the provisional Secretariat generously provided hitherto by the Government of Thailand.

(B) A research service center will be established in Bangkok under the Council Representatives to produce, for the benefit of member governments and of bodies set up within the SEATO framework, reports on current developments in communist activities.

(C) The public relations office in Bangkok will be expanded and a cultural relations office established to carry out new programs in these fields.

(D) An economic officer will be appointed to facilitate the important work in the economic field who will work closely with and under the direction of the Council Representatives.

(E) Organizational costs will be met from a common budget.

The Council was convinced that the work accomplished at this meeting would give a new and strong impetus to the promotion of the security and welfare of the treaty area. All the Foreign Ministers expressed the firm determination of their governments to press forward with their individual and collective efforts to safeguard the peace and well-being of the region as a whole.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES AT OPENING SESSION, MARCH 6

In 1954 we met at Manila to write our treaty of collective defense for Southeast Asia. In 1955, when the treaty came into force, we met at Bangkok to breathe life into the treaty words.

Now in 1956 we meet in Karachi to develop still further our partnership.

It is appropriate that we should now be in the capital of Pakistan. It is one of the newly independent nations of Asia which, even as we meet here, perfects its independence by adoption of its first constitution.

The United States values its membership in this organization because its purpose responds to our national dedication to advancement of liberty, peace, and happiness within the society of nations.

Since World War II, fifteen nations of Asia and Africa have gained political independence. This evolution has consistently had the moral and political support of the United States, and we have provided large military and economic assistance in terms of both men and money to enable independent nations of Asia and Africa better to sustain their independence and to enjoy more fully the blessings of liberty.

Today in Asia this United States policy continues to find expression in our active participation in SEATO, in other mutual security pacts, in our bilateral arrangements for economic aid, technical assistance, cultural exchange, in our membership in the Colombo Plan for economic development in Asia and in the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and in our bilateral agreements for sharing knowledge and materials to advance peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this latter connection I recall that only a few days ago President Eisenhower announced 20,000 kilograms of our fissionable material would be avail-

able for future peaceful use in other countries including those of Asia.³

In contrast stands the policy of the Soviet-Chinese Communists. Whenever they could they have swallowed up their neighbors or subjugated them. They have annexed territory comprising all or part of 10 states and also made 10 states into virtual colonies ruled by international communism.

That aggressive policy explains why free nations have developed collective security arrangements such as that which brings us here today.

Communist propaganda now attacks these collective security organizations. But it was not always so. When the Soviet Union felt itself endangered, it argued for adoption of a policy of collective security. Thus on March 10, 1939, prior to the outbreak of World War II, the leader of the Soviet Government spoke of aggressive intentions of Fascist states.

He said, "Combined nonaggressive democratic states are unquestionably stronger." But he complained, "A majority of nonaggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected a policy of collective security, a policy of collective resistance to aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention and a position of neutrality." This, he said, "means conniving at aggression."

Today Soviet rulers sing a different tune. They denounce collective security. Aggressive states always prefer that independent states should not help each other to preserve their independence. That is their preference, but it is not ours. In fact collective security has now been so widely adopted that it powerfully deters armed aggression.

So Soviet and Communist leaders are now emphasizing economic and political measures. Their economic measures are superficially like economic aid measures which have long been pursued by the United States. Of course, honest imitation would be as welcome as the sincerest flattery. But economic measures adopted by the United States and the other free nations have demonstrably aided other nations to preserve their political independence and their distinctive social and cultural institutions. On the other hand the Soviet and Chinese Communist purpose, as their history demonstrates, is to extend the sway of international communism, which, as Lenin said, involves "amalgamation of all nations." Soviet rulers have

³ See p. 469.

long held that among the first to be "amalgamated" would be "colonial and dependent peoples." And Soviet purpose has not been changed by the fact that many of these people now enjoy independence.

Khrushchev, head of the Soviet Communist Party, speaking to the Supreme Soviet as recently as last December 29, said in relation to the so-called "spirit of Geneva": "We never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for victory of communism."

That is why it is important for us here to develop not only those aspects of our organization which deter open armed aggression but also those aspects of SEATO which help members to combat subversion and to develop wholesome societies immune from Communist infection.

As we review the record of SEATO for the past year, there is ground for much satisfaction. The report of our Council Representatives shows that SEATO has made an important contribution to preservation of peace in the area. Under SEATO protection member states have registered appreciable progress in their economic development and in their capacity to resist armed aggression and subversion.

SEATO has encouraged stability, indispensable to social and cultural as well as economic progress.

We can take satisfaction from the fact that SEATO benefits other than its members. It has aided in the development and stabilization of newly independent countries in the treaty area—Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam—whose future seemed so precarious a year or more ago. Other free nations of Asia have also benefited both directly and indirectly from increased security of the treaty area.

For this gain we thank particularly the leaders of our Asian members. They are men of great political wisdom and experience. They are true patriots who can distinguish liberty from tyranny, even though tyranny attempts to disguise itself in the cloak of liberty.

Significant achievements of the past year should inspire us to even greater efforts in days, months, and years ahead in order that we may further promote peace and independence and serve to enlarge human opportunities for all. These are goals to which we are pledged by our treaty, by our Pacific Charter, and by the charter of the United Nations. May we here go forward in the future further honoring of these noble commitments.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES AT FINAL SESSION, MARCH 8

Press release 125 dated March 8

Those who study the record of our meeting will find that much has been accomplished. I hope that they will also find evidence of the spirit which made that accomplishment possible. We were drawn together, and we hold together, by the noblest and most enlightened of human sentiments—that is the desire to help one another.

To that sentiment is added another—that is the quality of courage which impels us to face danger together and not to seek immunity in the hope that someone else will suffer first from aggression.

So long as those two sentiments animate our countries, this organization will be strong and productive of much good. A deep debt of gratitude is owed to our host, the Government of Pakistan, for the excellent preparations and splendid facilities that have contributed so much to the success of this conference. The hospitality of the Government of Pakistan and its people has charmed and delighted us all. They have surrounded the serious business of the conference with pleasant associations that will never be forgotten. Our sincerest compliments are also due to His Excellency Hamidul Huq Choudhury, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. His guidance of our conference as its chairman contributed in no small measure to its very substantial accomplishments.

We owe great thanks to the Council Representatives that prepared for this meeting. Without their labors, it would not have been possible to make so many significant decisions during the 3 days of our session.

Now, we go our separate ways. But, wherever we go, we shall carry with us a sense of fellowship born of this gathering.

U.S. Views on March 4 Statement by Chinese Communists

Following is a statement released by the Department of State on March 6 (press release 115) commenting on a Chinese Communist statement of March 4 regarding the Geneva discussions which have been taking place between U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan.

The Chinese Communist statement of March 4 contains nothing new. Its failure, however, even to mention that the Chinese Communists still hold 13 Americans in prison, despite their agreement of last September—6 months ago—that these Americans would be permitted “expeditiously” to exercise their right to return to the United States, cannot be overlooked. This only reemphasizes that these Americans are being held as political hostages.

The reply which the United States made on January 21¹ to a similar Chinese Communist statement of January 18 is equally applicable to the Communist statement of March 4. The concluding paragraphs of that reply read as follows:

“1. Four months after the Communists announced that they would adopt measures to permit Americans in China to return to the United States, 13 Americans are still held in Communist prisons.

“2. The United States proposed that the parties renounce the use of force without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, in order that the discussions might take place free from the threat of war.

“3. The United States made clear that this renunciation would not prejudice either side in the pursuit of its objectives and policies by peaceful means.

“4. The Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, have deprived such acceptance of its value by refusing to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area.

“In short, the Communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force.

“The United States, for its part, intends to persist in the way of peace. We seek the now overdue fulfillment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking that the Americans now in China should be allowed expeditiously to return. We seek this not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at the foundation of a stable international order. We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force, particularly in the Taiwan area.”

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 164.

The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part I¹

by Harry N. Howard

The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems which have come to the United Nations from this vital part of the world. On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resurgent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of the economic development of underdeveloped countries still persisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as a matter of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free world.

In addition, toward the end of the year, the United States, together with other nations, was faced with a renewed and dynamic manifestation of Soviet interest in the general area of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In line with an old imperial Russian tradition and in accord with Leninist-Stalinist Communist doctrine, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the "relaxation of tensions" in Europe and pressed toward the achievement of its secular interests. The Soviets

exploited every weakness and every problem and employed every art, artifice, and instrument at their disposal, including their satellites and the international Communist apparatus. There seemed little doubt that they were seeking a dominant influence in the so-called uncommitted areas of South Asia and the Middle East.² Because of the seriousness of the situation, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, meeting at Paris on December 15-16, 1955, reviewed the "provocative moves and declarations by the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East and Asia" and recognized that Soviet tactics, "coupled with a continued increase in Soviet military capability, created new problems and a new challenge to the Free World."³

¹ For background, see Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 809, and Nov. 26, 1951, p. 839; "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1951-1952," *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 891, and Dec. 15, 1952, p. 936 (also available as Department of State publication 4851); "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1953," *ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 274, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 328, and Mar. 8, 1954, p. 365; and "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954," *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 256, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 301, and Feb. 28, 1955, p. 338 (also available as Department of State publication 5801).

² Recent Soviet actions called to mind the position of the Soviet Union in November 1940 that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" be "recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." See *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Department of State publication 3023), pp. 217-258; also, H. N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II," BULLETIN of July 18, 1948, pp. 63-78.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1047.

• Mr. Howard is United Nations adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Part II of his article, dealing with problems of regional security, and Part III, on mutual security and U.S. assistance programs, will appear in subsequent issues of the BULLETIN.

As in years past, in his report on the work of the United Nations for 1954-1955⁴ Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld touched on a number of basic problems involving the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Among other things, he referred to the Bandung conference (April 18-24, 1955), in which the nations of this area played a prominent part, and noted the great upheaval in the relations of nations and peoples which was under way, the direction of which, at least in some respects, seemed "clear enough." He noted that:

The peoples of Asia today, of Africa tomorrow, are moving towards a new relationship with what history calls the West. The world organization is the place where this emerging new relationship in world affairs can most creatively be forged.

The Secretary-General also dealt at some length with the troublesome issue of Palestine. He thought that too little attention had been given to meet "the emerging problems of the continent of Africa in a spirit consonant with the aims of the Charter," although the United Nations had been concerned with these problems "on a piece-meal basis." The issues, he said, were partly social and economic, partly political, and partly they belonged to the realm of trusteeship arrangements. In the Secretary-General's considered view:

The great changes that are under way in Africa present a challenge to the rest of the world—a challenge to give aid in guiding the course of events in orderly and constructive channels. It is apparent that in the next ten years the peace and stability of the world will be strongly affected by the evolution in Africa, by the national awakening of its people, by the course of race relations and by the manner in which the economic and social advancement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest of the world.

The Tenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted considerable attention to problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa and especially to the type of problems outlined above. Representatives of the nations of this area particularly emphasized the political, social, and economic problems confronting their peoples, but they were not alone in discussing them. Secretary Dulles laid special stress on the Arab-Israel conflict in his address of September 22,⁵ and both British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan and

French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay pointed toward the Middle East as an area of tension and controversy. In line with recent Soviet policy, in his address of September 23 Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov gave the distinct impression that the Soviet Union, now more than ever, was engaged in an attempt to win over the states of Asia and Africa to the side of the Soviet Union.⁶ Molotov reiterated Soviet opposition to "aggressive military blocs and coalitions" in general, and to such arrangements in the Middle East in particular.

SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ISSUES

As already noted, the United States was confronted during 1955 with a number of difficult political issues, some of which came to it through the United Nations and some more directly. Of special, although by no means exclusive, interest were those of French North Africa, Cyprus, and Palestine. Some of these problems became even more intense during the course of the year, although others appeared to be on the road toward possible solution as the year drew to a close.

French North Africa

The United States had an interest in the issues involving Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria not merely because of certain bases in Morocco or because of its politico-strategic interest in the entire Mediterranean region but also because it was interested in the stability of France as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the development and welfare of the peoples of this area. The problems of French North Africa had been discussed, it may be noted, at the Bandung conference in April 1955, and the 29 Asian-African nations represented there adopted a resolution supporting the "rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence" and urged the French Government "to bring about a peaceful solution without delay."⁷

Morocco—The problem of Morocco, which proved very troublesome during the first part of 1955, appeared on the road to solution by the year's end. Fifteen Arab, Asian, and African

⁴ U.N. doc. A/2011, *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1954-15 June 1955*, pp. xi-xvi.

⁵ BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/PV. 520, pp. 44-52.

⁷ For text, see Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C., *Report on Indonesia*, Vol. VI, No. 9 (June 1955), p. 30.

states on July 26 requested the inclusion of the problems of both Morocco and Algeria on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly, charging that the situation in Morocco had suddenly deteriorated.⁸ Although the item was inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly, there was no immediate discussion. On November 5, 1955, the former Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Yousef, once more was formally recognized as the Sultan, and the country's political and constitutional problems appeared to be moving toward solution. On his return to Rabat on November 18 as Sultan Mohammed V, the new ruler proclaimed the end of the French protectorate and looked toward a "new era of freedom and independence," although this was not to mean the end of all Franco-Moroccan ties. President Eisenhower sent a special message to the Sultan, recalling the relations which had existed between the United States and Morocco since the earliest days of the United States and expressing the hope that the reign would "open new vistas for that community of purposes which has contributed so much to the greatness of Morocco, and restore the peace and prosperity which the United States so deeply desires" for the people of Morocco. At the same time the United States indicated that the return of Mohammed V marked a significant step in the development of Franco-Moroccan cooperation, and it was felt that the already demonstrated friendly spirit augured well "for success in working out the mutually satisfactory arrangements" which, it was hoped, would "lead to the peace and prosperity of the Moroccan community."⁹

Thanks to these favorable developments, virtually no discussion of the Moroccan issue took place at the General Assembly. Instead, on December 3, 1955, the Assembly agreed unanimously to postpone further consideration of the item. There was, indeed, much commendation of France for the statesmanlike way in which the problem had been handled. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Representative, declared in the Political Committee that the constructive developments which had taken place since 1954 had given great satisfaction to the United States. He extended the American people's "best wishes" to Sultan Mohammed V and the Moroccan people. In view of the Franco-Moroccan agreement Am-

bassador Lodge felt it incumbent on the General Assembly to do everything possible "to contribute to an atmosphere in which the parties directly concerned can work out the outstanding problems between them," the solution of which would require "the utmost good will, patience, and restraint on both sides." Ambassador Lodge expressed the hope that the pending negotiations would "strengthen the links of friendship between the people of France and Morocco."¹⁰

Algeria—In distinction to Morocco, Algeria is a part of metropolitan France, and a crisis developed in the United Nations with regard to inscription of the Algerian item. The United States opposed inscription because of the constitutional position of Algeria. The question was inscribed on September 30 by a vote of 28-27-5, despite the threat of the French delegation to boycott the General Assembly. French Foreign Minister Pinay advised the General Assembly to "weigh the consequences, all the consequences" of such a decision; the "whole future of our organization" was at stake, he warned. Mr. Pinay's basic argument was that Algeria had been an integral part of France for over a century, and he declared that the Algerians were citizens of France, with far more rights than the citizens of some states whose representatives were voting for inscription.¹¹ Because of the action of the General Assembly, the French delegation withdrew entirely from the General Assembly on September 30 and did not return until November 29 when, by unanimous action, the Assembly removed the Algerian item from its agenda.¹²

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1040.

On Jan. 26, 1956, the Department of State announced its intention to request congressional action to end U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in Morocco. The rights had been accorded in 1787 and renewed in 1836. In the light of progress being made by France and Morocco "in working out their future relationships," the United States considered it appropriate to modernize its own treaty relationship with Morocco with regard to extraterritorial rights (BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 204).

On Mar. 2, 1956, France and Morocco signed an agreement virtually ending the 1912 protectorate, and France confirmed its recognition of Moroccan independence; see p. 466.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 530, pp. 193-6. For "Basic Factors on Algeria," see *Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information*, No. 24 (November 1955). For Ambassador Lodge's statement of Sept. 22 in the General Committee, see BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.

¹² *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 992.

⁸ U.N. docs. A/2923/Add. 1, A/2924/Add. 1, and S/3414.

⁹ BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894.

Tunisia—The problem of Tunisia was not placed upon the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly for the primary reason that on June 3, 1955, the French Government and the Tunisian leaders had reached an agreement whereby Tunisia was granted internal autonomy. The agreement provided for a monetary and customs union, with France retaining control over defense, internal security, and finance and the exclusive right to extend technical and financial assistance. A French High Commissioner was to exercise all powers remaining to France and to be responsible for the protection of French interests; the French commanding general was to be responsible, as Minister of Defense, for the naval and air bases at Bizerte and other military installations.

Following approval of the agreement, Secretary Dulles on August 10 expressed U.S. satisfaction that a new framework for close Franco-Tunisian cooperation had been established.¹³ He considered it significant that agreement had been reached "through negotiations on a basis of equality between the parties directly concerned" and declared that France and Tunisia could "take real satisfaction and pride in the achievement of this agreement." The negotiations, in his view, demonstrated that "mutually satisfactory progress can be made on such difficult problems if they are dealt with in time by the parties concerned with determination, realism, and good will." On August 27, the Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed el Amin, ratified and sealed the convention restoring internal autonomy to Tunisia, and the documents were exchanged and deposited in Paris on August 31.

The Problem of Cyprus

A troublesome issue of special concern to the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey, involving the problem of self-determination, was that of Cyprus. It had been before the General Assembly during 1954, but, after 2 days of discussion, that body decided against further consideration at the time.¹⁴ During 1955, however, the problem became more intense, with growing violence on the Island of Cyprus. On May 9, the Greek Government advised the Secretary-General of the

United Nations that developments in Cyprus were "unfortunately assuming a particularly alarming character" and reserved "the right to consider such action" as might be necessary.

With a view to a possible solution, the United Kingdom on June 30 announced invitations to the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference at London for discussion of "political and defense questions which affect the eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus."¹⁵ Both Greece and Turkey accepted the invitation early in July; the former, on July 23, requested inscription of the problem of self-determination for Cyprus on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

When the London conference convened on August 29, three essential elements appeared to be involved: (1) the Greek position concerning self-determination, (2) the Turkish position regarding the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority and Turkish security, and (3) the British position that common security interests in the eastern Mediterranean should be considered. The conference ended on September 7, without having achieved substantial result.¹⁶ Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who presented the Greek case on August 31, called for self-determination within a reasonable time, pledging that Greece would give the United Kingdom unlimited use of military bases on Cyprus and offering other base rights on the Greek mainland, but indicating that Greece would regard the discussions as a failure unless the right of self-determination were recognized.¹⁷ Essentially the Turkish view was that the agitation concerning self-determination was largely artificial, that the right of the large Turkish minority must be protected, and that, for reasons of Turkish security, the island should remain in British hands.¹⁸ The United Kingdom, which had stressed the security aspects of the

¹³ See British Information Services, *Eastern Mediterranean: Proposed Conference*, T. 23 (July 1, 1955); *Cyprus—A New British Initiative* (August 1955), pp. 8-10.

¹⁴ See the United Kingdom, *The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey, London, August 29-September 7, 1955*. Cmd. 9596.

¹⁵ For certain aspects of the Greek case, see Royal Greek Embassy Information Services (Washington), *Cyprus Demands Self-Determination* (1954) and *British Views on Cyprus* (1955).

¹⁶ Turkish Information Office (New York), *Turkish Views on Cyprus* (1955).

¹³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 301.

¹⁴ For brief background, see H. N. Howard, *The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954*.

problem, on September 6 offered Cyprus a new constitution giving island residents more self-rule and a prospect of ultimate self-determination. But it was obvious by September 7 that no agreement was possible, and the final communique of the conference indicated that Foreign Secretary Macmillan would study the Greek and Turkish statements.

The failure of the London conference to achieve anything more substantial, and the subsequent intensification of the problem, appeared not only to weaken the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav treaty which had been signed on February 28, 1953, but also to sap the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the vital eastern Mediterranean—matters in which the United States was very much concerned. Moreover, it now seemed clear that Greece would make every effort to have the problem inscribed on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

The riots in Istanbul and Izmir on September 6-7, and the vast damage which they wrought, were also most disturbing to the United States, although it did not comment publicly at once. On September 18, the Department of State announced that Secretary Dulles had sent personal messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers.¹⁹ The announcement characterized

as most regrettable recent evidences of tension between the Governments of Greece and Turkey. Present differences between these two countries resulted in widespread violence in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir. We have expressed to the Turkish Government our deep concern over these disorders, which have not only caused extensive physical damage but have also exerted an adverse influence on Turkish-Greek friendship at a time when these two allies are in great need of mutual understanding.

In his identical communications to Prime Minister Papagos and Prime Minister Menderes, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance which the United States attached to "continued close cooperation between Greece and Turkey." He could not believe that, in the light of their record of common achievement, any problem would "long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish friendship," nor that "the unhappy events of the past two weeks" would reverse policies of cooperation initiated under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk. Mr. Dulles recalled the assistance which the United States had rendered

to Greece and Turkey since 1947 because of its belief that the Greco-Turkish partnership constituted "a strong bulwark of the free world in a critical area." But if the bulwark were "materially weakened, the consequences could be grave indeed," and he urged that every effort be made that the partnership not be impaired "by present disagreements." He was confident, however, that the spirit of cooperation which the two countries had so often demonstrated as members of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Balkan Alliance would enable them "to transcend immediate differences in the interests of free world unity."

The Greek and Turkish replies to the Dulles communication were made public on September 21. Premier Papagos expressed appreciation of the message and noted the necessity of NATO unity, but he felt that it did not take account of the fact that Greece was an injured party, and he complained concerning Turkish "hostility against Greece." He said that he expected moral and material reparation from Turkey and held that the latter should take the initiative in the renewal of mutual confidence. On the other hand, Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey warmly thanked Secretary Dulles for his message; he expressed regret for the events of September 6-7 and concern for continued Greek-Turkish friendship, within the framework of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Balkan Alliance.

On September 29, President Eisenhower assured King Paul that he remained convinced of "the paramount importance of the ties of strong friendship which unite Greece and the United States." Even if there were "differences of opinion over how the Cyprus question should be handled," that one issue would not be permitted to "trouble our deep friendship and sympathy for Greece."²⁰

Meanwhile, on September 21 the Greek request for inscription of the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly was considered in the General Committee. At the outset, Anthony Nutting, the United Kingdom representative, expressed regret that the London conference had produced no solution. He declared that the United Kingdom devoutly hoped that consultations would be renewed and was ready to consider "amendments or counterproposals" to its recent "con-

¹⁹ BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 496.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.

structive and far-reaching" suggestions concerning Cyprus, which were "designed to lead to the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation." But he felt that extended discussion in the United Nations would not prove helpful. He observed that the Greek purpose was to acquire sovereignty over Cyprus and warned that debate might generate heat which would "light flames elsewhere."²¹

On the other hand, Ambassador George V. Melas not only maintained that Greece was sponsoring a legitimate petition of a distinct national entity but rejected "with contempt" the charge that Greece was a "troublemaker." He asserted that the British proposals concerning Cyprus were a "denial of democracy." He presented the case for self-determination, pointing out that the principle was enshrined both in the Atlantic Charter and in the United Nations Charter, and recalled the "very sad and depressing things" which had happened in Turkey. In turn, Ambassador Selim Sarper of Turkey took exception to the remarks of the Greek representative, to whom he had listened with a feeling of "almost physical pain." Ambassador Sarper declared that Turkey still attached "importance to friendship and alliance with Greece," which was a necessity for the maintenance of stability in the eastern Mediterranean, but he warned against the effects of the self-determination argument for Cyprus and noted that Greece itself was a "mosaic" of minorities.²²

Ambassador Lodge, who did not enter into the substance of the issue, expressed the view that such problems should be included if there were reason to suppose that discussion would "promote the purposes of the charter."²³ The U.S. decision to oppose inscription was a "painful" one because it was contrary to Greek desires, especially in the light of the "tragic events" which had just occurred in Turkey. Nevertheless, the United States took what seemed "the course of true friendship" in an effort to avoid what might prove in reality to be "a disservice to our charter goals, both those relating to non-self-governing territories and those relating to the development of friendly relations among nations."

In the end, by a vote of 4-7-4, the General Com-

mittee recommended against inscription. The General Assembly upheld the recommendation on September 23 by a vote of 28-22-10.

During the Assembly's discussion on inscription, Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos contended that, under the charter, the United Nations had both the right and the duty to offer an opportunity for self-determination to the Cyprian people, and he repeated that Greece had turned to the United Nations because of the failure of diplomatic negotiations. Mr. Nutting, however, declared that the "real aim" of the Greek Government was "acquisition of Cyprus and not constitutional self-government in the island." He closed with a solemn pledge on behalf of the United Kingdom, through an unrelenting endeavor "to work out a solution to this tangled, difficult and delicate issue." Ambassador Sarper declared that discussion would serve no useful purpose but would inflame relations, and he challenged the competence of the United Nations to deal with the status of Cyprus, which, he contended, had been settled in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Ambassador Lodge reiterated the position which he had taken in the General Committee, noting that a decision against inscription "would not mean that nothing will happen." Rather it meant that the matter could and would be dealt with "under different and more auspicious conditions," in which "quiet diplomacy" might prove more effective, and he pledged that the United States would "continue an active interest in the Cyprus situation." V. K. Krishna Menon of India, who abstained, favored independence for Cyprus; he remarked:

But we do not think in the present circumstances, when negotiations have been proceeding, and when there is violence in the area, and when this undertaking has been given to carry on negotiations and bring about a settlement in a peaceful manner, that the purposes of the Charter and the prospects of a settlement would be advanced by public debate in this Assembly.²⁴

At the close of the discussion, Mr. Nutting issued a statement expressing British satisfaction with the "clear-cut decision by the Assembly that inscription and discussion" of the Cyprus question would be unwise. He was glad that the General Assembly had "heeded our warning about the consequences of a debate which could only be bitter and further arouse passions between

²¹ U. N. doc. A/BUR/SR. 102, pp. 2-3.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

²³ BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 545.

²⁴ For the discussion as a whole, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 521, pp. 53-65.

friends" and repeated that the United Kingdom would "now make unremitting endeavors to find an acceptable solution to this problem," which affected "three friendly countries."²⁵

Problems in the Arab-Israel Controversy

As in years past, both the United States and the United Nations faced many troublesome problems in connection with the Israel-Arab controversy. The U.N. Secretary-General, in his annual report, declared "with great regret" that the "lack of any improvement in the political situation in the Middle East has continued to prevent the United Nations from assisting countries in that region in the way in which it should do so." The Secretary-General pointed out that economic and social problems in this area were accumulating and that, under existing conditions, some of the means of economic and social development which had "proved most effective in other regions" were denied to the Middle East. The catalog of problems included the broad, perennial issue of attempting to bring about some peaceful settlement of the specific problems involved; the question of armed incidents along the demarcation lines; restrictions on shipping within the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba; the need for equitable distribution of the waters of the Jordan River for irrigation and hydroelectric purposes; and the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine. The additional nuance of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement further complicated the picture during the latter part of 1955.

THE U.S. PROGRAM

Secretary Dulles expressed the basic concern of the United States for peace and security in the Middle East in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York on August 26, when he outlined American policy with regard to

²⁵ See also the statements of Foreign Secretary Macmillan on Dec. 5, 1955, and of Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, Jan. 1, 1956, in *British Information Services*, T. 53 (Dec. 6, 1955) and T. 1 (Jan. 10, 1956).

After 5 months of direct negotiation with the Cyprians, the British Government announced on Mar. 3, 1956, that it had failed to reach agreement on the character of an amnesty, the responsibility for public security, and the composition of an elected majority in the Assembly; the principle of self-determination had not been under discussion.

Palestine issues and Arab-Israel relations.²⁶ He pointed to the progress which had been made toward settling such Middle Eastern issues as that of the Suez Base since May 1953, when he visited the area, but drew attention to outstanding issues. He noted that Ambassador Eric Johnston was then on his fourth visit to the Middle East in connection with the Jordan River project. According to Secretary Dulles, there were three basic problems which had been left unsolved by the Armistice Agreements of 1949: (1) the tragic plight of 900,000 refugees who formerly lived on the territory now occupied by Israel; (2) the pall of fear hanging alike over Arabs and Israelis; and (3) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and its neighbors.

Solution of the refugee problem, in the Secretary's view, required that these "uprooted people" be enabled to resume a life of dignity and self-respect through resettlement and, where feasible, repatriation. The need for more arable land could be met by practical projects for water development. Compensation to the refugees was due from Israel; if necessary, an international loan might be made "to enable Israel to pay the compensation which would enable many of the refugees to find for themselves a better way of life." President Eisenhower would recommend substantial American participation in such a loan, as well as an American contribution "to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would, directly or indirectly, facilitate the resettlement of the refugees."

Projects to aid refugee resettlement would do more than enable people to enjoy a better life; they would also assist in eliminating the problem of "recurrent incidents" which had plagued and embittered life on both sides of the armistice lines. But security could be assured "only by collective measures which commit decisive power to the deterring of aggression." President Eisenhower had authorized Secretary Dulles to state that, given a solution of the other related problems, he [the President] would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Secretary Dulles hoped that other countries would be willing to support such a security guaranty and that the United Nations would

²⁶ BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

sponsor it. Under such collective security measures the fears could be resolved and political leadership in the Middle East could "devote itself to constructive tasks."

Since the Armistice Agreements of 1949 had not determined permanent frontiers, agreement concerning borders should precede a boundary guaranty. The overall advantages to be gained by such a guaranty were well worth the adjustments required to convert "armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety," and Secretary Dulles believed it "possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties." The United States was willing to assist in finding a solution to this problem, and, if agreement could be reached on the basic problems of refugees, security, and boundaries, it was thought possible to solve other issues, largely economic, and also to reach an agreement concerning the status of Jerusalem. The United States was ready to support a review of the latter problem by the United Nations.

Secretary Dulles said that the purpose of his statement was to demonstrate the possibility for improvement and make clear that the United States was disposed to encourage that possibility by contributions of its own, if desired. He concluded:

At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which has long prevailed between the Soviet and Western worlds, can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle East? That is our plea. The spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing that which involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honor.

U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld immediately welcomed the Secretary's address and declared that American willingness to participate substantially in an international loan to assist the Arab refugees "might well prove to be an approach to this humanitarian problem which would mark the beginning of a general stabilization of conditions in the area." Similarly the United Kingdom, on August 27, endorsed the proposals as "an important contribution toward the solution of the most critical problem in the Middle East." The United Kingdom was ready to play

its full part "in an effort to bring about more settled relations" and declared, as had already been stated on April 4, that it was ready to guarantee "by treaty or treaties with the parties concerned any territorial settlement so agreed." The United Kingdom welcomed American willingness to participate both in security guaranties and in an international loan and hoped that the governments concerned might be disposed to examine the possibilities of settlement. The French Government also substantially endorsed the proposals. Sir John Kotelewala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, declared on August 28 that the suggested program would "provide a useful starting point" for a "further sincere and determined effort" to settle outstanding Israel-Arab differences; Ceylon, too, was ready to assist "in the search for a peaceful solution."

At his news conference on August 30, Secretary Dulles declared that his address had been "a very carefully considered statement" and he did not desire to elaborate on it "in terms of substance" until there had been responsible comment from Middle Eastern Governments.

Although there was no official Arab comment concerning the Dulles suggestions, unofficial comment was critical. The Israel Government, on the other hand, appeared rather favorably impressed but desired more information with regard both to frontier guaranties and to frontier adjustments. In an address on September 11, Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, declared that, while Israel was "ready in the proper context for mutual adjustments of the boundary lines," it would "accept no unilateral territorial concessions."

Secretary Dulles again discussed the problem of peace in the Near East in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22.²⁷ He noted that the situation in that area remained troubled, repeated his proposals, indicated that the United Kingdom and a number of other governments had expressed their support, and added that, if there was a favorable response from the Near East, "many aspects of this problem would eventually come to the United Nations for its action at some future session."

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523. See also the remarks of Ambassador Eban in the General Assembly on Oct. 3 in U.N. doc. A/PV. 532, pp. 215-19.

PROBLEM OF ARMS SHIPMENTS

Closely related to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East was the problem of arms shipments to that area. Secretary Dulles indicated on August 30 that, although he had no direct proof as yet, the Department of State had received unofficial reports that the Soviet Union had offered to supply arms to some Arab States. Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced an Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms arrangement on September 27.

On the same date Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan discussed the problem in New York.²⁸ They declared that the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom were based on the desire, on the one hand, to enable the countries of the Middle East to provide for internal security and defense and, on the other, "to avoid an arms race which would inevitably increase the tensions in the area." They hoped that other governments would also be guided by these principles. The Department of State sent Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen to Cairo on September 28 to look into the problem.

The Israel Government indicated that it would have to study the implications of the report that Egypt was making arrangements for the purchase of arms. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government insisted on its sovereign rights in the matter and declared that it had sought unsuccessfully to purchase arms from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The French Government aligned itself with the Anglo-American position, but the Soviet Government, as was to have been expected, held that each state had the right to look after its defenses and to purchase weapons for defense requirements on the "usual commercial terms," a position which was echoed by the Czechoslovak Government on October 3. Meanwhile, the Council of the Arab League supported the Egyptian position, and Saudi Arabia and Syria indicated their willingness to make similar arrangements.

Secretary Dulles commented on the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arrangement on October 4,²⁹ noting that as a result of Assistant Secretary Allen's visit to Cairo there was a better understanding of the problem, although he had no reason to believe that the arrangement would not be implemented. Re-

calling his statement of August 30 that the Arab countries were independent governments and free to do whatever they wished in the matter, Mr. Dulles declared that, from the standpoint of Soviet-American relations, "such deliveries of arms would not contribute to relaxing tensions," and he added:

It is difficult to be critical of countries which, feeling themselves endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for defense. On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the conditions which prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get security through an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasant to speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet-bloc leaders.

The Secretary of State referred to his address of August 26 and repeated his proposal for a security guaranty under the United Nations, which, he believed, "would relieve the acute fears which both sides now profess." Since he did not know the precise character or extent of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arrangement, or whether it might "seriously upset the balance of power" in the Middle East, Mr. Dulles could not say whether the United States might ship arms to Israel. In the main, he pointed out, it had been American policy "to avoid participating in what might become an arms race," and he still hoped that it would be possible "to avoid getting into that situation."

Prime Minister Eden expressed similar views in an address at Bournemouth on October 8, noting the "grave risks" of the "crudest form of arms race" and declaring that, if an outside great power stepped in to supply arms "on an infinitely larger scale," the risks inevitably would be intensified.

The problem soon was complicated further by Soviet promises of extended economic and technical assistance, and the situation became more tense. Secretary Dulles touched upon the matter again on October 18,³⁰ indicating that there might be some informal discussion of it with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the Geneva conference. He did not consider that "very certain conclusions" could be drawn from the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, which was based on the broad concept of avoiding both a serious imbalance of power and an armaments race in the Middle East. Nor could he yet judge the military significance of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arrangement, since

²⁸ BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 604.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1955, p. 688. See also the address of Assistant Secretary Allen before the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum on Oct. 17, 1955, *ibid.*, p. 683.

the "business of secondhand arms" was "very difficult to appraise accurately" and the value of the discards was not always easy to judge.

Israel Prime Minister Moshe Sharett also spoke at length on the possible arms race in an address before the Israel Knesset on October 18, accusing Egypt of misdeeds along the Israel demarcation lines and expressing approval of Mr. Dulles' address of August 26, although he declared there could be "no unilateral territorial concessions on the part of Israel." Mr. Sharett considered the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement a danger to Israel, along with the British shipment of arms to Iraq and other Arab States. But because arms were a "prime necessity" for its defense, Israel would "not refuse arms from any possible source." At the same time, Mr. Sharett contended that no power was justified in withholding a security pact from Israel and attached "particular importance" to one with the United States, to which Israel had considered itself "entitled" for a long time.³¹

Prime Minister Sharett later journeyed to Paris and Geneva in order to present Israel's position to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. He visited the United States during November-December in the interest of arms and a security guaranty.

THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION

Meanwhile, from Denver, Colo., President Eisenhower issued a statement concerning peace in the Middle East on November 9.³² He said he felt that nothing which had happened since 1954 had invalidated "our fundamental policies . . . based on friendship for all of the peoples of that area." In the President's view, true security "must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement," and he recalled the U.S. offer of August 26 to join in "formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors." Recent developments had made a settlement all the more imperative, and the President declared that the United States would continue to play its full part and would "support firmly the

United Nations," which had "already contributed so markedly to minimize violence in the area." He hoped that other nations of the world would cooperate in this endeavor, "thereby contributing significantly to world peace."

Prime Minister Eden also discussed Middle Eastern problems on November 9, referring both to the U.S. proposals of August 26 and to the "new element of danger" brought into the picture through the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement.³³ He paid tribute to the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), regretted that the Jordan River Valley project had not yet been approved, and said that the powers "must somehow attempt to deal with the root causes of the trouble." Because of its "long tradition of friendship with the Middle East," the United Kingdom had "a special responsibility" in the area. The United Kingdom was aware of the respective Israel and Arab positions concerning terms of peace, the resolutions of the United Nations in 1947 and afterward, and the Armistice Agreements of 1949, and he felt that the only solution was some kind of compromise on territorial claims, in the interest of which the good offices of the United Kingdom would be available. If there could be some accepted agreement about boundaries, the Prime Minister believed the United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps other powers would be prepared to give a formal guaranty to both sides. This might, at last, bring "real confidence and security," and there would also be financial and other assistance "over this tragic problem of the refugees."

On November 15, in a message read at a rally in New York City, President Eisenhower repeated the American willingness to sign a Middle Eastern security guaranty, provided agreement was reached between Israel and the Arab States concerning boundaries, and stressed the view that current problems were capable of pacific settlement.³⁴ He considered a threat to Middle Eastern peace as a threat to world peace and indicated that the United States would continue to be guided by the policies of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, which, he thought, best promoted "the interest and security of the peoples of the area." In the President's view:

³¹ On Oct. 24 the Knesset approved a resolution expressing its anxiety concerning the arms shipment to Egypt and the continued arming of Iraq and other Arab States.

³² BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 845.

³³ For text of this address, made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, see British Information Services, T. 48 (Nov. 10, 1955).

³⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894.

The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other Nations in the Near East, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world.

The Department of State indicated on November 16, following visits of the Israel and Egyptian Ambassadors, that the United States "would view with grave disapproval anything which would lead to hostilities in the Middle East."³⁵ Two days later, the Department declared that the United States and the United Kingdom were "working closely together in their common interest in the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute." The two governments saw "eye to eye" on the imperative necessity of an early settlement, as had been clearly indicated by the President on November 9 and by the Secretary of State on August 26.

Toward the end of November, Prime Minister Eden clarified the British position before the House of Commons. On November 22, he reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and on November 24 he declared that (1) there was nothing in his address of November 9 involving "very substantial" concessions of territory by Israel, (2) Israel should cooperate in solving the problem of the 900,000 Arab refugees, and (3) there could be no real settlement without Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist. He had not attempted to specify any details concerning a compromise but was convinced that a settlement would be so valuable that both sides would find concessions "more than worthwhile." The Prime Minister added that, although he did not want to bind his American friends to every word he had spoken, it was a fact that the United Kingdom and the United States were in "close agreement in this difficult business."

On December 6 Secretary Dulles, who had had a discussion with the Israel Foreign Minister on the previous day, declared that the United States continued "to feel very strongly that there should be a solution" of the Israel-Arab problem.³⁶ He

³⁵ On Nov. 10 the Department announced that it had "let it be known that we would be strongly opposed to the side which starts a war and would be very favorably disposed to the side which convinces us that it desires to maintain peace."

³⁶ BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1009. Foreign Secretary Macmillan told the House of Commons on Dec. 12 that the Soviet Union was doing everything possible to make the problems of the Middle East "utterly insoluble."

held the need for a solution to be imperative and hoped that both sides would see the advantages of a settlement, but he would not say that there were any "concrete developments which could be adduced as proof that they have been so convinced as yet"; the possibilities, in his view, still existed.

TENSION ALONG BORDERS

But despite these efforts 1955 did not bring a settlement in the Arab-Israel controversy. Tension along the demarcation lines³⁷ continued unabated, with the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Syrian demarcation lines the major center of conflict, rather than the Israel-Jordan boundary as in years past.³⁸

Israel-Egyptian relations worsened during 1955, with the continuance of Egyptian restrictions against Israel shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba³⁹ and numerous infiltrating raids across the demarcation lines in the Gaza region. The first serious incident of the year was Israel's "retaliatory" raid in the Gaza strip on February 28, in which 39 Egyptians and 8 Israelis were killed and 30 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded, an act for which the United Nations Security Council censured Israel on March 29, 1955.⁴⁰

In line with the suggestions of Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the Security Council on March 30 called upon the parties to cooperate in (1) establishment of joint patrols along sensitive portions of the demarcation line, (2) negotiation of a local commanders' agreement, (3) erection of a barbed-wire obstacle along sections of the line, and (4) manning of all outposts and patrols by regular forces.⁴¹ The difficulties continued, however, and on April 13 General Burns declared that the significant element in the increased tension had been the mining of tracks used by Israel army trucks—an action which might have been in retaliation for the Gaza incident.⁴²

³⁷ For a map of Israel showing boundary and demarcation lines, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 303.

³⁸ One serious incident occurred on the Israel-Lebanese demarcation line on Sept. 22; an armed gang attacked a bus, killing three persons and wounding nine, one of whom was an American citizen.

³⁹ See, for example, the Israel complaint of Sept. 27, 1955 (U.N. doc. S/3442).

⁴⁰ For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 659 and p. 661.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 662; U.N. docs. S/3373 and S/PV. 693.

⁴² U.N. doc. S/3990.

The increasing seriousness of the situation prompted Ambassador Lodge, as President of the Security Council, to express his concern to Council members on June 7; his letter (copies of which were sent to the Egyptian and Israel representatives to the U.N.) noted that, if General Burns did not receive the necessary cooperation of the parties, another meeting of the Security Council might be necessary.⁴³

Nevertheless, incidents continued, and the discussions under General Burns did not go well. Incidents which resulted in heavy casualties and sundry claims and counterclaims had seriously inflamed the situation by the end of August. A cease-fire was accepted by September 4, but General Burns was convinced that a repetition could be avoided only if the opposing forces were separated by a physical barrier and kept 500 meters on each side of the line.⁴⁴ The Security Council met on September 8 and unanimously adopted a resolution (1) noting the cease-fire, (2) calling on Israel and Egypt to bring about peace and order in the Gaza region and particularly "to desist from further acts of violence and to continue the cease-fire in full force and effect," (3) endorsing the Burns proposals concerning separation of the opposing forces, (4) calling for freedom of movement of United Nations observers (some of whom had been detained in Israel), (5) calling for full cooperation with General Burns, and (6) requesting the latter to report to the Security Council on implementation of the resolution.⁴⁵

Although both Egypt and Israel conditionally agreed on September 27 to the UNTSO request to withdraw from the demilitarized zone, the situation did not improve and shooting incidents continued, with provocations on both sides. On November 2, following a statement of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that Israel was ready for peace with Egypt, Israel forces struck at Egyptian positions which were beyond the old border in the demilitarized zone, with the result that 50 Egyptians were killed and 40 wounded, and 4 Israelis killed. United Nations observers were not permitted to go to the scene. On November 3, the U.N. Secretary-General proposed a peace plan calling for clear delineation of the demarcation

lines and the withdrawal of armed forces. At the same time he protested the detention of United Nations observers and expressed "grave concern" over the incident in a protest to the Israel representative at the United Nations.⁴⁶ Two days later the Department of State also issued a statement⁴⁷ following a conference of Assistant Secretary Allen with Ambassador Eban and Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein; it noted with concern the "increasing tempo" of Israel-Egyptian hostilities and violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides. It strongly supported the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement by peaceful methods, particularly those proposed by General Burns, and declared that United Nations observers should have "full liberty to perform their peaceful functions."⁴⁸

In contrast to the situation on the Egyptian-Israel demarcation lines and to that which had generally obtained in the period of 1949-54, the Israel-Jordan line was relatively quiet. On April 18, a local commanders' agreement, designed to minimize incidents and other hostile acts in the Jerusalem area, was accepted on an informal basis.⁴⁹ But the situation along the Israel-Syrian line, always tense, flared into open conflict. There were occasional Syrian forays across the Israel line and numerous charges and countercharges, with mutual recriminations. On October 22 an Israel force killed 3 Syrian soldiers, wounded 6, and took at least 5 prisoners, in what the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization termed a "well-planned" operation.⁵⁰ On December 11 a much more serious incident developed when Israel forces, estimated at some 600 men, attacked Syrian outposts overlooking

⁴⁶ See also Israel protests of Nov. 1 and 8, 1955, and Mar. 13, 1956 (U.N. docs. S/3454, 3456, 3559).

⁴⁷ BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 786.

⁴⁸ Of the disturbances during the first 10 months of 1955 for which responsibility has so far been determined, Egypt was held responsible by the UNTSO for some 30 incidents, in which 4 Egyptians and 16 Israelis were killed and 4 Egyptians and 59 Israelis were wounded, while Israel was held responsible for 21 incidents, in which 47 Egyptians and 9 Israelis were killed and 45 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded.

⁴⁹ During the first 10 months of 1955 there appear to have been 12 incidents for which Israel was held responsible, in which 4 Jordanians and 3 Israelis were wounded. Jordan was held responsible for 18 incidents, in which 8 Jordanians and 6 Israelis were killed and 1 Jordanian and 13 Israelis wounded.

⁵⁰ See also U.N. docs. S/3448 and 3451.

⁴³ BULLETIN of June 20, 1955, p. 1016.

⁴⁴ See U.N. docs. S/3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3430, 3431, 3433.

⁴⁵ For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 458.

Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), killing 56 Syrians and taking 29 prisoners, with at least 6 Israelis among the dead. The Israel Government charged that Syrian troops had fired at Israel fishermen on the Sea of Galilee, but the UNTSO held that there had been violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides, pointed to the increase in tension, and noted Syria's resentment at the denial of fishing rights. There was, moreover, mutual embitterment because of failure to return prisoners. But the report of the UNTSO held:

The Israeli action on the night of 11/12 December was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the general armistice agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria.

Like the Kibya and Gaza incidents with which the Security Council has had to deal, the Tiberias incident has been explained by Israel as a retaliatory action on a large scale. In these three cases, Israel forces have acted by surprise and after striking a heavy blow, they have returned to their base. There is, however, a risk in such retaliatory action, viz that the attacker may not be able to limit the extent of the operation to that planned. Such actions may well produce a violent reaction by the forces of the attacked country and what had been conceived as a limited raid develops into full-scale hostilities. In the present atmosphere of tensions and military activity, this possibility must be faced.⁵¹

ACTION IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

There was some justification for the fears expressed by the UNTSO. On December 15, the eve of the discussion of the problem by the Security Council, the Egyptian Government advised the Secretary-General that, in view of the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Treaty of October 20, 1955,

⁵¹ U.N. doc. S/3516 and Add. 1, Corr. 1. According to official Israel estimates, during the first 6 months of 1954 Israel casualties in clashes on the Sea of Galilee totaled 2 killed and 7 wounded. At least 25 incidents were reported in the first 10 months of 1955 "causing loss of life and property," but without specification. Most of the clashes occurred when Syrian military outposts dominating the corner of the sea opened fire to defend Arab fishermen threatened by Israeli police patrols or to interfere with Israel shipping. On the other hand, according to the UNTSO, Israel complaints concerning incidents in 1954 reached 14, involving 2 killed and 8 wounded, while there were 24 complaints in 1955, with no casualties. Again according to UNTSO, there were 14 Syrian complaints during 1954, involving 5 killed and 6 wounded; in 1955 there were 26 complaints involving two wounded.

On Mar. 4 there was an incident on the Sea of Galilee involving Syrian forces and Israel police; 4 of the latter were killed (U.N. docs. S/3554, 3555, and 3558).

Egypt considered the attack against Syrian forces "an aggression against Egypt" and felt compelled "to treat force with force."⁵²

During the discussions in the Security Council, Israel was unanimously condemned for the action against Syria.⁵³ The resolution of January 19, 1956,⁵⁴ held that interference by Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias in no way justified the Israel action. It reminded Israel that the Security Council had already condemned the raid against the Jordanian village of Kibya (October 14-15, 1953) and the retaliatory attack in the Gaza region (February 28, 1955).⁵⁵

The attack of December 11-12, 1955, was condemned as a "flagrant violation" of the cease-fire provisions in the Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948, and of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949. The Security Council also expressed "its grave concern at the failure of the

⁵² U.N. doc. S/3514.

⁵³ Ambassador Eban made a spirited defense of Israel on Jan. 17, among other things charging that, as a result of "acts of aggression organized on the responsibility of Arab Governments," some 884 Israelis had been killed or maimed since 1951 (U.N. doc. S/PV. 713, p. 36).

⁵⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.

⁵⁵ For the discussions, see U.N. docs. S/PV. 707-715; for various drafts of the resolution, see U.N. docs. S/3519, 3528, 3530 and Revs. 1-2, S/3532, S/3536, and S/3537. See also the Israel memoranda of Dec. 21 and 29, 1955 (U.N. docs. S/3518, 3524). Although the Council recognized some provocation, all members felt that Israel's action was out of all proportion to the provocation; as Ambassador Lodge declared on Jan. 12, 1956, it could not "be accurately described as a retaliatory raid." Ambassador Lodge added, "The Security Council must do more than condemn. It must warn the Government of Israel that another transgression will compel it to consider what further measures under the charter are required to maintain or restore the peace" (BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 182).

Meanwhile, it may be noted that the UNTSO did not accept the Israel charges that Egypt had sabotaged General Burns' attempt to ease the situation in the Gaza region. The primary difficulty continued to lie in the fact that the Egyptians desired to demarcate all three sides of the demilitarized zone triangle, whereas the Secretary-General had proposed demarcation of only the side which constituted the old Palestinian-Sinai frontier. Despite Israel's charge that Egypt had rejected the proposals, the UNTSO for the third time denied the Israel charge and stated that "disturbance of public opinion in Arab countries," following Israel's retaliatory action in the Sea of Galilee, had made further progress in negotiations impossible. There had been no serious clashes in the El Auja area since Nov. 2. It may be noted that the UNTSO denied a similar Israel charge on Nov. 18.

Government of Israel to comply with its obligations" and called upon Israel to do so in the future; otherwise the Council would have to consider "what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace." The resolution called upon the parties to comply with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement to respect the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and requested the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias "without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts." Both parties were called upon to arrange with the Chief of Staff to implement the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in good faith, and especially "to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions."

On January 24, 1956, during his visit to the Middle East, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld announced that Egypt had accepted the proposals with regard to the easing of tensions in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone at El Auja (Nitsana), which had been originally set forth on November 4 and which Israel had accepted on January 4. These proposals dealt with border markings and withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone. At the end of his visit the Secretary-General indicated that he was somewhat hopeful concerning the possibility of peace, although he did not minimize the difficulties.⁵⁸ Both Arab and Israel leaders, he indicated, had reaffirmed their faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, had expressed their determination, "in accordance with their obligations under the Charter and under the General Armistice Agreement, to abstain from any acts of hostility or aggression and above all to settle conflicts, when they may arise, by peaceful means." The Secretary-General was convinced that such an attitude was essential for a lessening of tensions and the development of that calm in which alone it would "be possible to make a constructive approach toward the solution of outstanding problems."⁵⁷

⁵⁸ U.N. press release SG/464, Jan. 30, 1956.

⁵⁷ See also U.N. doc. S/3539 (Jan. 24, 1956) for Israel memorandum.

Other Issues

There were many other issues, not always of direct concern to the United States, but nevertheless matters of interest which bore promise of one sort or another for the future. Thus, for example, the Sudanese Parliament, on December 19, 1955, adopted a unanimous resolution for independence, which was duly proclaimed on January 1, 1956.⁵⁹ The United States extended recognition on the same date, and on January 2 President Eisenhower sent a message declaring that the United States looked forward to friendly relations with the Government of the Sudan and wished it "every success in establishing a stable, prosperous and happy nation."⁶⁰ The United States also endorsed the application of the Sudan for U.N. membership, which the Security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly on February 6.⁶⁰

Another long-smoldering issue was that between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. Attempts at arbitration had failed by the fall of 1955, and forces of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat, supported by the Trucial Oman levies, entered the area on October 26. The Saudi Government informed the Security Council in October that it reserved the right to bring the matter before the Council; no further action has been taken, however, and the possibility exists that Saudi Arabia will discuss the matter directly with the British.⁶¹

Still a third problem was that of Goa, involving India and Portugal, which had broken relations concerning the question. Secretary Dulles on August 2 stated that the United States was concerned with tension in that area as in any other. He noted that it had

always been our policy to favor the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. That is, of course, a principle which is expressed in the charter of the United Nations. That applies to Goa as well as to any other place in the world. We are pleased to note that, as I recall, Prime Minister Nehru affirmed that principle for his own Government,

⁵⁹ The Anglo-Egyptian controversy concerning the Sudan, in the settlement of which the United States was much interested, ended formally with the agreement of Feb. 12, 1953.

⁶⁰ BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1956, p. 354.

⁶² For the British and Saudi positions concerning the matter, see U.N. docs. S/3450, 3452, 3465.

and I am confident that that is also the view that will be taken by the Government of Portugal.⁶²

Subsequently, during the visit of the Portuguese Foreign Minister to the United States on December 2, a joint communique referred among other things to allegations concerning "the Portuguese provinces in the Far East," in view of various statements made during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India.⁶³ In a statement of December 6, Secretary Dulles pointed to the context of the statement, which had been directed against the introduction of hate and prejudice into a situation calling for calmness but which had not taken "any position on the merits of the matter." The United States believed that such problems should not be settled by force—a general approach which, he felt, Prime Minister Nehru shared.⁶⁴ On December 29 the United States sent a note to the Indian Government to this effect.

French-Moroccan Declaration

Department Announcement

Press release 117 dated March 7

On March 2, 1956, the Foreign Minister of France and the Prime Minister of Morocco signed a Joint Declaration which recognized the independence of Morocco and affirmed the will of the two nations to define, as equal and sovereign partners, the new conditions which will govern their future relationships.

It is fitting that on this occasion the United States should pay tribute to the farsighted and generous statesmanship which has opened a new chapter in the history of collaboration between the two nations.

Our representatives in France and Morocco have been instructed to convey our congratulations on this occasion.

Message to Acting Foreign Minister of France¹

Press release 118 dated March 7

My Government has instructed me to convey warmest congratulations to your Government on the farsighted statesmanship which has culmi-

nated in the Joint Declaration of March 2, 1956 by the French and Moroccan Governments. My Government is particularly gratified that the Declaration, which recognizes the independence of Morocco, should also reaffirm the will of both nations to work out their destinies together and thus to assure the continued contribution of France to the future of Morocco.

Message to Sultan of Morocco²

Press release 119 dated March 7

I have been instructed by my Government to convey to Your Majesty and His Government and to the Moroccan people warmest congratulations on the recognition of Morocco's independence, as embodied in the Franco-Moroccan Declaration of March 2, 1956.

My Government renews its wishes for the peace and prosperity of Morocco, and has asked me to express its gratification that Morocco has freely chosen, as a sovereign nation, to continue in the path of its traditional friendships.

Text of Declaration³

[Unofficial translation]

The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, affirm their desire to put into full operation the declaration of La Celle Saint-Cloud of November 6, 1955.

They note that, following the evolution achieved by Morocco on the road of progress, the Treaty of Fez of March 30, 1912, no longer corresponds henceforth to the necessities of modern life and can no longer govern Franco-Moroccan relations.

Consequently the Government of the French Republic solemnly confirms the recognition of the independence of Morocco, which specifically implies a diplomacy and an army, as well as its desire to respect and have respected the Moroccan territorial integrity guaranteed by international treaties.

The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, declare that the negotiations which have just opened at Paris between Morocco and France, sovereign and equal states, have as their object to conclude new accords which will define the interdependence of the two countries in the domains where their interests are common, which will thus establish their cooperation on the basis of liberty and equality, notably in matters of defense, of external relations, of economy,

¹ Delivered to His Cherifian Majesty Mohammed V on Mar. 7 by Julius C. Holmes, Diplomatic Agent of the United States in Morocco.

² Signed at Paris on Mar. 2 by Foreign Minister Christian Pineau of France and Premier Embarek Bekkai of Morocco.

⁶² BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 966.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1007.

¹ Delivered by Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon on Mar. 7.

and of culture, and which will guarantee the rights and liberties of the French established in Morocco and of the Moroccans established in France respecting the sovereignty of both states.

The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, agree that, pending the application of these agreements, the new relationships between France and Morocco will be founded on the terms of the protocol annexed to the present declaration.

PROTOCOL

I. The legislative power is exercised sovereignly by His Majesty the Sultan. The representative of France is cognizant of projects of Dahirs and of decrees: he will submit observations when the texts refer to the interests of France, of Frenchmen, or of foreigners during the period of transition.

II. His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, will establish a national army. France will lend its assistance to Morocco for the constitution of this army. The present status of the French Army in Morocco remains unchanged during the transition period.

III. Administrative powers reserved until now will be the subject of a transfer whose modalities will be decided under common agreement.

The Moroccan Government will be represented with the right to speak and vote in the committee of the franc zone, the central directing organ of monetary policy for the entire franc zone.

On the other hand, guaranties enjoyed by French officials and French agents serving in Morocco are maintained.

IV. The representative of the French Republic in Morocco will carry the title of High Commissioner of France.

Letters of Credence

James C. Hagerty, press secretary to the President, announced on March 2 that the President had that day received the credentials of the newly appointed Ambassador of Japan, Masayuki Tani.

Visit of Prime Minister of Ireland

The Department of State announced on March 8 (press release 122) the members of the party for the visit to the United States of John A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland, who will arrive in Washington on March 14:

John A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland
John Joseph Hearne, Ambassador of Ireland
Alexis Fitzgerald, special personal assistant to the Prime Minister
Charles Murray, Principal Officer, Prime Minister's Department

William Howard Taft, 3d, American Ambassador to Ireland

John F. Simmons, Chief of Protocol, Department of State

John P. Meagher, Press Officer, Department of State

The Prime Minister will spend 3 days in Washington and a week in and near New York City. He will remain in the United States until March 29.

Educational Exchange Agreement With Denmark Extended

In an exchange of notes on February 17 the United States and Denmark extended the agreement between the two countries dated August 23, 1951, to provide for a program of educational exchange under the Fulbright Act for an additional 5-year period. The notes were exchanged in a brief ceremony at Copenhagen by the United States Ambassador to Denmark, Robert D. Coe, and the Danish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, H. C. Hansen, representing their respective governments.

The exchange of notes provides for the continuance of the program at its present level (\$180,000 annually). The funds made available will be used to finance travel of Danish nationals to the United States for study, teaching, lecturing, or advanced research and to pay travel and maintenance costs for Americans to engage in similar activities in Denmark.

Nearly 600 exchanges have or will have taken place between Denmark and the United States during the first 5 years of the program's operation.

In presenting the American note, Ambassador Coe said it was a matter of particular gratification to him that, when the end of the program was threatened by the expiration of supporting funds, great initiative was shown in Denmark to find ways and means for its continuation. He paid particular tribute to the interest shown and the efforts made by the Danish press as well as leaders in the academic world to have the program extended.

He concluded his remarks by saying:

This exchange has not only had its effects on the individuals concerned but has enriched many institutions in both our countries. I am pleased therefore that the Danish Government fully cooperated with my Government, which has made funds available to continue this program for an additional five years. International

cooperation through cultural exchange is the basic idea of the Fulbright program, and it was a Danish poet who said that "... good ideas cannot die until even better ideas have grown from their seed." The renewal of the Fulbright Agreement between our two countries testifies to the strength of a good idea.

The Prime Minister expressed sincere gratitude on behalf of the Danish Government for continuation of the program, and stated:

Apart from their scientific and technical value such cultural exchanges have resulted in a substantial contribution to our knowledge of cultural and social life in the United States. Similarly, we hope that these visits may also have extended American knowledge of the cultural, social and economic conditions of our country.

He added that the program "has proved an important link in the chain of Danish-American friendship."

Report on Refugee Relief Act Transmitted to Congress

Press release 113 dated March 6

Forty-nine percent of all visas that have been issued under the Refugee Relief Act were issued in the 6-month period from July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1955. Total visas issued as of December 31 were 73,331; an additional 13,000 visas have been issued since January 1, 1956.

Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, announced the figures for the last half of 1955 in the fifth semiannual report, transmitted to Congress on March 5. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 allocated 209,000 visas to bring in refugees, escapees, expellees, relatives, and orphans. The act expires December 31, 1956.

Complete success is already assured for the program in Greece and Italy. For these two countries "cutoff" dates for applicants and sponsors were announced near the end of 1955.¹

Considering the number of visas issued, cases now in process, and the rate new cases are being received, it is expected that goals will be reached by the end of 1956 for the following categories: the Italian allocation of 60,000 visas; Greece, 17,000; escapees in NATO countries, 10,000; Palestine refugees in the Near East, 2,000; and Asians indigenous to the Far East, 5,000.

Reporting that the program is moving forward in all areas and prospects are encouraging, Mr.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917, and Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

Gerety cautioned that, despite an accelerated rate of processing cases, the program may need citizen assurances to cover as many as 55,000 persons, considering maximum visas allowable. He pointed out that one of the greatest single elements adversely affecting the Refugee Relief Program continues to be the lack of an adequate flow of assurances from American citizens for certain countries and categories of refugees.

Sponsors are needed for refugees and escapees in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands; non-Asians stranded in the Far East; and orphans. Ninety thousand visas were allocated for escapees and expellees (largely from behind the Iron Curtain) now residing in Germany and Austria. Considering visas issued, cases in process, and the rate assurances are being received, the German-Austrian allocation may need assurances to cover as many as 39,500 persons. Improved economic conditions in Germany have lessened the demand for visas under the act. Nevertheless, there are large numbers of eligible refugees, expellees, and escapees still waiting to come to America, and assurances are needed to provide visas for those who seek them under the act.

Further sponsorships from American citizens may also be needed to cover, in approximate numbers, 13,000 visa possibilities for relatives and refugees in the Netherlands; 1,700 non-Asians who were stranded in the Far East; and 800 orphans worldwide. The total visa allocations made by the Refugee Act to those areas are: the Netherlands, 17,000; Far East, non-Asians, 2,000; orphans, 4,000. An assurance (or sponsorship) may cover more than one person, in the case of families; a visa covers only one person.

Persons in many employment categories are among those waiting to come to the United States. Thirty-three voluntary agencies, 41 Governor's Committees for the Refugee Program, and many local and national organizations are available to aid citizens in sponsoring refugees.

Transportation to the United States for many of the refugees during the past 6 months was provided by chartered air flights and special sailings of the *General Langfitt*, a converted Navy transport under charter by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. The *Langfitt* made seven trips from July 12 to December 16, with 8,257 passengers.

The tabulation by states of verified refugee assurances shows the following 10 (in order

listed) to be leading in number of assurances furnished: New York, Illinois, California, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michigan, Connecticut, and Wisconsin.

Iron Lungs Rushed to Argentina for Polio Epidemic

Press release 114 dated March 6

The U.S. Government through the Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration, and the U.S. Air Force, and with the cooperation of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, is rushing a shipment of 21 iron lungs to Argentina, where a serious epidemic of poliomyelitis has broken out. Since January 1, upward of 800 cases have been reported, most of them in the area of the capital city of Buenos Aires; and the disease is spreading at the rate of approximately 60 cases a day. U.S. Ambassador Albert F. Nufer informed the Department of State of the urgent need for iron lungs and other equipment.

The American Red Cross is in touch with the Argentine Red Cross to ascertain the nature and extent of assistance needed and will coordinate its own activities with those of the U.S. Government agencies cooperating. Acting on behalf of the U.S. Government, the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis is flying two of its experts to Buenos Aires to confer with Argentine authorities and to determine what further equipment, drugs, and other assistance are needed. The Foundation is preparing to send two or more teams, each consisting of a doctor, a nurse, and a therapist.

The iron lungs, obtained through auspices of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, and other equipment are being flown to Buenos Aires by the U.S. Air Force.

Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Indonesia

Press release 111 dated March 2

On March 2 Anak Agung Gde Agung, Minister of Foreign Affairs, representing the Republic of Indonesia and Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., American Ambassador, representing the United States signed in Djakarta an agreement for the sale of

U.S. surplus commodities valued at approximately \$96,700,000. This agreement was concluded pursuant to the provisions of title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as amended)¹ and will be implemented over a 2-year period.

Payment for the commodities will be made in Indonesian rupiahs. A major part of the funds generated by the agreement will be loaned to the Indonesian Government for development purposes, with eventual repayment to the United States. The remainder will be used for U.S. Government expenses in Indonesia, agricultural marketing development in Indonesia, and the carrying out of an educational exchange program between Indonesia and the United States.²

Distribution of Additional Quantities of Uranium 235

White House press release dated February 22

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Mankind's hopes and aspirations for peace and greater well-being are closely linked to the world's progress in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The program to further this development has advanced steadily in the past two years.

I am announcing today further steps by the United States toward the production of peaceful power from the atom.

At the recommendation of Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in which the Departments of State and Defense concur, I have determined, under Section 41b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, that substantial quantities of the special nuclear material uranium 235 may now be designated for research and development purposes and for fueling nuclear power reactors at home and abroad. This material will be available for either sale or lease under conditions prescribed by the United States Govern-

¹ For the third progress report on P. L. 480, see BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 130.

² The Department of Agriculture announced on Mar. 2 that the agreement covers about 550 million pounds of rice, valued at \$35.8 million; about 206 thousand bales of cotton, valued at \$36 million; 23 million pounds of leaf tobacco, valued at \$15 million; and about 1,270,000 bags of wheat flour, valued at \$5 million. About \$4.9 million is included for ocean transportation.

ment. The Commission's recommendations are based on extensive studies that have been in progress since enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The quantities of uranium 235 which will be made available for distribution over a period of years under this determination are:

a. In the United States, through lease for all licensed civilian purposes, principally for power reactors—20,000 kilograms.

b. Outside the United States, through sale or lease for peaceful purposes, principally power and research reactors—20,000 kilograms. This is in addition to the 200 kilograms already made available for research reactors abroad.

It is not intended that nations which are presently producing uranium 235, or the Soviet Union and its satellites, shall share in this distribution.

Distribution of special nuclear material will be subject to prudent safeguards against diversion of the materials to non-peaceful purposes.

The quantities of uranium 235 to be made available as a result of this determination will permit us to carry out our responsibilities in the development of atomic energy for the common defense and security of the United States and for contributing to the peace and general welfare of the world.

Significant actions are under way to create an international agency and an integrated community for Western Europe to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States welcomes this progress and will cooperate with such agencies when they come into existence.

The special nuclear material to be made available will support the start of nuclear power programs with a generating capacity of several millions of electrical kilowatts. With this assurance, such programs may be undertaken in the next several years, in this country and abroad.

As additional projects are undertaken by our industry and by other nations, more nuclear fuel will be required. The Atomic Energy Commission has informed me that it will recommend that additional supplies be made available as become necessary in the future.

This action demonstrates the confidence of the United States in the possibilities of developing nuclear power for civilian uses. It is an earnest of our faith that the atom can be made a powerful instrument for the promotion of world peace.

STATEMENT BY LEWIS L. STRAUSS CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The President's action in authorizing the Atomic Energy Commission to make available 40,000 kilograms of uranium 235 for use here and abroad in the development of nuclear power is the most important step toward peaceful uses of atomic energy since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The President's action has two major aspects:

a. It authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to provide sufficient U-235 to meet the estimated requirements of the private and public power groups in the United States which, in the role of pioneers, have announced plans for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

b. It enables the Commission to respond to the top-priority question concerning the availability of nuclear fuel being asked by our friends abroad who wish to negotiate agreements with the United States for assistance in developing their respective nuclear power programs.

We are now embarking on programs of aid in nuclear power development, extending beyond our previous programs of support of atomic energy research in the United States and abroad. Under these new programs we will provide U-235 to support nuclear power development during the life of the licenses issued under our civilian applications program at home and the expected life of agreed power reactor projects abroad using our fuel. The 40,000 kilograms of U-235 available to domestic and foreign users will not all be distributed in the coming year or in any other single year. It will be distributed over a period of years as needed, with smaller amounts in the early years.

Prior to the President's action today, the United States offered to make available, within prudent security considerations, to friendly nations prepared to invest their own funds in nuclear programs both access to and training in the new technology of theory, design, construction and operation of power reactors.

We have carried out that promise in several ways. At the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva in August 1955, the United States presented, along with the valued contributions of other nations, much data useful in nuclear power research and development. We also have encouraged friendly

nations to seek, under mutually acceptable standards of necessary security, more precise data and assistance in the power reactor field.

The research type of bilateral agreements for cooperation now in effect with 26 nations contain these words:

It is the hope and expectation . . . that this initial Agreement . . . will lead to consideration of further cooperation extending to the design, construction, and operation of power producing reactors.

Several nations are presently negotiating with us for the type of agreement envisioned in the bilateral research agreements.

As for training representatives of friendly nations in the new technology of power reactors, we have organized a special school at the Commission's Argonne National Laboratory from which 40 scientists and engineers already have been graduated and 30 more are now attending classes. These 70 men come from 29 nations. It is planned to extend this training. Among other means will be a proposed educational and research institution in the Far East.

In the present state of the nuclear art, countries with available water power or supplies of coal and oil will, for some time to come, find it more economic to build and operate conventional power plants.

The authorization of 20,000 kilograms of uranium 235 to be made available for lease to civilian users in the United States was based on estimates of current and future needs. These include the needs of existing licenses and pending applications for licenses as well as proposals received by the Commission—including proposals under the Power Demonstration Reactor Program—which seem likely to lead to the filing of license applications during the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1956.

Only part of the special nuclear material will be distributed in any one year. Licenses may be issued for a varying period extending up to 40 years, and delivery of U-235 to licensees will be spread over the life of the licenses, to permit start-up of reactors and replacement of fuel as required in later years.

The U-235 will be distributed under provisions of Section 53 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and will be allocated to specific licensees only on the basis of a Commission determination of the licensee's need for the material.

The procedures which will govern the distribu-

tion of the 20,000 kilograms of U-235 to be made available to other countries, as well as charges for sale or lease, will be announced in the near future. However, based on the value of \$25 per gram of contained U-235 for enriched uranium leased for research reactors, as announced by the United States Atomic Energy Commission at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the 40,000 kilograms of U-235 now made available for such sale or lease would have a value of one billion dollars.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 84th Congress, 2d Session

Report on Audit of Commodity Credit Corporation for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954. H. Doc. 279, December 12, 1955. 90 pp.

Distinguished Civilian Awards and Cultural Interchange and Development. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor on various bills relating to awards of medal for distinguished civilian achievement and cultural interchange and development. July 5, 6, 1955; January 20, 26, 27, 1956. 436 pp.

Nineteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 91, January 1956. 200 pp.

Report on Audit of Export-Import Bank of Washington for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1955. H. Doc. 314, January 16, 1956. 11 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, 84th Congress. Part 1, January 25, 1956. 45 pp.

Nomination of Robert R. Bowie. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the nomination of Robert R. Bowie to be Assistant Secretary of State. February 7, 1956. 26 pp.

Fifteenth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities. Letter from chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Department of State, transmitting the Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange for the period July 1 to December 31, 1955, pursuant to section 603 of Public Law 402, 80th Congress. H. Doc. 335, February 10, 1956. 21 pp.

International Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and Advertising Material. Report to accompany Executive Q, 83d Congress, 1st Session. S. Exec. Rept. 3, February 14, 1956. 6 pp.

United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Secretary of State transmitting the fourth report on the extent and disposition of United States contributions to international organizations for the fiscal year 1955 pursuant to section 2 of Public Law 806, 81st Congress. H. Doc. 337, February 14, 1956. 78 pp.

Extending Greetings to the Sudan. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 70. S. Rept. 1485, February 16, 1956. 2 pp.

Importation of Certain Handwoven Fabrics for Use in Making Religious Vestments. Report to accompany H. R. 4376. S. Rept. 1487, February 20, 1956. 2 pp.

Transfer of Amorphous Graphite from Dutiable List to Free List. Report to accompany H. R. 3653. S. Rept. 1488, February 20, 1956. 3 pp.

Authorizing Participation by the United States in Parliamentary Conferences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 501. H. Rept. 1808, February 23, 1956. 3 pp.

Purposes of Proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation

Following are texts of statements made before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives by Secretary Dulles on March 1 and by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks on March 2.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 107 dated March 1

I come here today to support the President's proposal that the United States join with other nations in establishing an Organization for Trade Cooperation. United States membership in the Organization would be authorized by H. R. 5550, introduced by the chairman of this committee [Representative Jere Cooper] at the last session.

The project of an Organization for Trade Cooperation was undertaken on American initiative, proposed by the present administration after careful study. Successful international negotiations leading to the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation were completed among 35 governments in the spring of 1955. It is our conviction that this Organization is needed in order that American agriculture, industry, and labor may obtain maximum benefits from our reciprocal trade program. It is also our conviction that the Organization will enhance the collective economic strength of the free nations.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation has a simple basic purpose: to provide formal machinery to administer more effectively the multilateral trade agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Along with this, the Organization would generally facilitate international cooperation in trade matters.

In order to make this statement as clear as possible, I invite your attention to a matter of terminology. Whenever I refer to the "general agreement," I mean the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between this long-established multilateral trade agreement and the new agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, or Orc, which is now before you for consideration.

The United States has participated in the general agreement for 8 years under the Trade Agreements Act, which authorizes the President to "enter into foreign trade agreements." In that time the list of countries which are parties to the general agreement has grown from 23 to 35 and now embraces most of the important trading nations of the free world.

When this administration took office, we reexamined the question of continued American participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We found that American participation was serving the national interest of the United States by strengthening economic ties with our partners and allies. We found, too, that after 8 years of experience some improvement in the trade practice rules of the general agreement was required. And we found serious defects in the arrangements for administering the general agreement. Its so-called "organizational provisions" hardly amounted to more than an awkward improvisation.

The President has already acted to revise the trade-agreement rules in the general agreement. Within the limits of the authority granted to the Executive by the Trade Agreements Act, the United States has negotiated and accepted a series of amendments to the general agreement designed to clarify and simplify its provisions to the extent practicable in this complex field.

In our approach to the organizational provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, however, the President has felt it wise to proceed in another way. After careful study, we concluded in 1954 that a formal international organization was needed if the general agreement

was to be fully effective on a continuing basis. And we also determined that the matter of our membership in such an organization should be submitted to the Congress.

Thus our purpose is to create better machinery to administer the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and to do it with the explicit approval of the Congress.

It is my conviction that this is essential if our trade policy is to be stable, if it is to be responsible, and if it is to be genuinely effective in furthering our national objectives.

Now, I know from my appearance before the Senate Finance Committee last year,¹ when the question of the Organization for Trade Cooperation was touched upon in connection with the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, that a number of things have been said or may be said which could give rise to certain fears about the Otc and its impingement upon United States sovereignty. In my judgment much of this apprehension results from misunderstanding. It might be helpful to the committee, therefore, if I were to try to clear away these fears at this time.

The Otc agreement contains nothing which alters or can alter United States tariff rates or other trade measures. It is essentially administrative. It does not add to the President's authority to enter into trade-agreement commitments pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act. Any substantive undertakings by the United States with respect to its trade regulations must either be entered into by the President under the Trade Agreements Act or be specifically approved by Congress. No substantive undertakings of any kind are authorized by H. R. 5550.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation will be a cooperative organization of sovereign nations; it will not be a so-called supranational institution. It will not involve a loss of sovereignty on the part of the United States or any other government.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation does not involve a delegation by the United States to an international organization of authority or control over its own tariff and trade regulations. The Otc could not impose any new obligation upon any member.

The Otc would help promote competition and private enterprise. The basic idea behind both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and

the Otc is to allow the fullest possible competition in the market, rather than government controls, to determine the movement of international trade, for that is the way trade best performs its beneficial functions. Thus the Otc is quite the opposite of any sort of global planning agency.

Functions of the OTC

The functions of the Otc are briefly these:

Administering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Making it easier for governments to consult and negotiate with one another on trade questions.

Studying questions of trade policy and, where appropriate, making recommendations thereon to the member nations.

And, finally, collecting, analyzing, and publishing facts and figures on international trade and commercial policy.

Thus, the functions of the Otc would be strictly limited to matters of trade and trade policy. It does not share the elaborate ambitions of the International Trade Organization, or Ito, which was proposed some years ago and later abandoned. The Ito, if it had come into being, would have had responsibilities in the fields of full-employment policy, of fair-labor standards, of technical and financial aid to underdeveloped countries, of investment, of commodity agreements, and of international cartels. The Otc will not have responsibilities in any of those fields. It could not administer any international agreement other than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It would, in short, keep firmly within the bounds of our trade-agreements program.

Let me say that in negotiating the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation we deliberately avoided giving the Organization any undertakings in the related fields that I have just listed in connection with the Ito.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation is not a "self-amending" organism. It does not contain the seed of its own automatic enlargement. No amendment to the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation could bind the United States without its consent, and, if the executive branch felt that an amendment were in the interest of the United States and should be accepted, it would be submitted to the Congress for approval.

The text of the agreement on the Otc²—some 21

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1955, p. 171.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

brief articles in all—has been reproduced for the information of the committee in the committee document entitled "The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation." It will be seen that the Organization would be relatively simple in structure. The members of the Orc would be those governments which belong to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There would be an Assembly, consisting of all of the members, which would have full responsibility for the Organization's activities. Then there would be an Executive Committee, a smaller group of 17 members which would carry out assignments given to it by the Assembly. The Orc agreement requires that the Executive Committee shall always include the five members of chief economic importance, thus giving assurance that the United States will always be represented on this Committee.

I might add parenthetically that the economic importance of the United States is such that the Organization could not really work without our pervasive participation and support. This is freely recognized by other governments. In 8 years of experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade the United States has been represented on every committee, subcommittee, and working group in which it has expressed an interest. Any fear that American influence may not be fully exercised, or adequately felt, is groundless.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation would also have a secretarial staff, supervised by a Director-General who would be appointed by the members. This staff of experts would assist the Assembly and the Executive Committee in their work; it would have no independent powers or responsibilities.

As for the budget of the Organization and the American contribution to it, both would be small—in fact, very small. For the first year we anticipate that the total budget would not exceed \$600,000, and the United States share would not exceed \$120,000 or about 20 percent. It should be noted that this share is below the percentage of 33½ percent established under other laws of the United States relating to American contributions to international organizations in general.

Key Responsibilities of the OTC

The main task of the Orc would be to help its members obtain more promptly than at present the full benefits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. And in administering the trade pro-

visions of the general agreement, the Orc would perform a number of necessary tasks of administration—for example, reviewing the trade restrictions which now are applied by certain foreign governments for balance-of-payments reasons. The two key responsibilities of the Orc in relation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are explicitly set out in the Orc agreement before you, and I wish to describe them briefly at this point.

The first of these responsibilities, described in article 13, is that of enabling individual member governments to obtain a curtailment of their trade obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade whenever such obligations prove severely burdensome or inequitable in the face of exceptional developments. Experience has shown that flexibility of this kind is needed. Very recently the United States itself has had occasion to seek, and obtain, a similar waiver from the other countries which participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These countries agreed that certain obligations we had assumed under the general agreement could be set aside whenever they were in conflict with agricultural import restrictions which we find necessary under section 22 of our Agricultural Adjustment Act.

The second of the organizational responsibilities explicitly described in the agreement before you is that of arranging for the settlement of disputes. This point is covered by article 14. The Organization is not given a hunting license to probe at will into the affairs of members. It is not an international policeman. But if one government has reason to complain about the trade actions of another and cannot obtain satisfaction in bilateral discussions, it may then bring the matter to the Organization for discussion. For example, if the Organization discovers that a country has breached its commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and if that country is unwilling or unable to do anything about it, the Organization may authorize complaining governments to withdraw some of the trade concessions which they originally made to that country. In this way a balance of mutual advantage is maintained in line with the principle of reciprocity, trade wars are averted, and a fair method of reaching solutions in international trade controversies is provided.

These two important organizational functions—that of waiving particular trade obligations and

that of settling trade disputes—have been removed from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and placed in the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation in order that their nature would be entirely clear to the Congress. I should like to emphasize once more that neither these nor any other functions of the Orc could have the effect of placing new trade obligations on any member going beyond those which they have voluntarily assumed in negotiating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Let me be very clear on what the Congress will be approving if it enacts H. R. 5550.

The Congress will be authorizing the President to accept membership for the United States in the Organization for Trade Cooperation.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has not been submitted to the Congress for approval because, as I have indicated, the authority to enter into trade agreements without referring them back to the Congress is found in the Trade Agreements Act. The general agreement, therefore, is in the same status as any of the many other trade agreements which have been entered into by the President.

The Congress is being asked to approve membership in an organization which, under the terms of the organizational agreement now before it, is to be established in order to further the objectives of the general agreement by providing more effective administration. Congress is not being asked to approve the detailed provisions of the general agreement—to endorse the detailed actions which the President has taken in exercising the authority which Congress granted to him in the Trade Agreements Act.

Significance of OTC in International Relations

The Orc, then, is a modest proposal to place the international aspects of our trade-agreements program on a more stable footing and a more business-like basis. I am convinced that it would serve American economic interests. The President described some of the economic advantages in his Orc message of last April 14,⁸ which you also have in the committee document. But I shall not discuss the commercial aspects in detail. Other witnesses who will follow me here will refer more fully to the economic benefits we may expect to derive from membership in the Orc. It is my

special responsibility, rather, to point out the significance of the Orc for our international relations in general.

That significance, in my judgment, is very great. I have often said that the strategy of the international Communist movement is to divide the free nations, so that they can be taken over piecemeal. We have seen no deviation in this strategy over many years. We have seen shifts in tactics, but the purpose has remained fixed. We must hope that it will change. There are some signs that it may change. But it has not changed yet.

We are now being treated to a display of this strategy on the economic front. The current offers of the Soviet Union to extend economic help in loans to, and trade with, less economically developed countries in the free world are a matter of everyday newspaper comment. I would be the last to give credence at this time to the existence of a genuine Soviet desire to help independent countries to nourish their economic growth in conditions of freedom. But there is the danger that some may unwittingly risk their freedom, so intense is their desire to improve the material lot of their people.

It is not a part of our design to allow our own actions to be determined by Soviet gestures. Quite apart from Soviet tactics, we seek solid and permanent programs to help economic progress in other countries and to raise the living standards of their peoples along with our own. Our programs began many years before the Soviet Union gave the appearance of entering the economic field. What we offer is partnership in building with others a safe, free, and productive civilization. This requires not only collective security against military menace; it also requires economic health and growth, hand-in-hand with political independence and mutual respect among nations.

It is hard to see how this kind of system can work without mutually advantageous international trade arrangements. Perhaps because of the immediate importance of trade to the daily living of people in many countries, trade problems have been historically a fruitful source of political controversy between the independent sovereign states. The Communist leaders have been aware of this and have tried to show that the struggle for markets is such a divisive force in the relations between non-Communist nations that it will inevitably lead to economic and social crises. This is a part of the standard Communist appeal to peoples in doubt.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1955, p. 678.

Cooperation Among Free Nations

The answer to the Communist contention does not lie in reducing healthy competition among free countries in the international market. We want more of this healthy competition and more private enterprise, not less. Nor does it call for obliterating sovereign rights over trade, or establishing free trade. What is needed is a willingness of the free nations, first, to moderate unjustifiable trade barriers in cooperative agreements with one another and, second, to agree to handle in an orderly and equitable way the trade problems and controversies which inevitably arise between them.

We have made heartening progress in clearing away unwarranted barriers to trade through our trade-agreements program, most notably through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But our machinery for applying the general agreement to day-to-day problems and for the settlement of trade controversies is weak and precariously based. The Organization for Trade Cooperation is needed in order to strengthen this second vital aspect of our trade relationships with other countries of the free world. There is great advantage in arrangements which will take international trade disputes out of the realm of political diplomacy and into a technical forum.

Not long ago the United States delegation to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly sent to me a rather forceful statement, approved by all 10 members of the delegation.⁴ As you know, our delegation is made up of distinguished Americans, including two Members of this House. The delegation said that there appears to have been a shift in the cold war, "in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront." It warned that we could lose the economic contest unless the country as a whole "wakes up to all its implications."

I read this statement to a news conference on January 11. It was generally taken to be an important pronouncement. Some people, assessing the implications of the "economic contest," seem to have judged them largely in terms of our foreign aid programs. I should like to emphasize that the role of economics in international affairs has much greater significance than grants of aid. Our cooperation with other free nations goes far beyond that. It must include other economic re-

lations as well, and at the heart of these relations lies trade cooperation.

If the Congress approves H. R. 5550, the Orc will undoubtedly come into existence. If Congress fails to approve the bill, it will not. This is a measure of decisive importance in world trade matters.

The consequences for our international relations of rejecting Orc would be grave. For what is ultimately at stake here is not whether a piece of technical machinery shall be established; it is whether, in the crucial area of trade relations, the unity of the free nations will be preserved and strengthened. It is for these reasons that I hope the Congress by a decisive majority will authorize United States participation in the Orc.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY WEEKS

I have come before you this morning to support H.R. 5550. This bill would authorize the President to accept United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (Orc).

The committee has already heard the Secretary of State discuss the advantages of the proposal from the standpoint of our overall foreign policy. These broad national-interest reasons weigh heavily in favor of United States membership in Orc. But I believe there are also direct foreign-trade benefits to be gained from membership. My purpose today is to outline these advantages for the committee.

The main function of the Orc would be to administer the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, commonly known as the GATT. In addition to this main function, it would provide a forum for discussion of other trade problems, each government remaining entirely free to adopt or reject recommendations growing out of such discussion. It would also assemble and publish data on world trade.

The United States has adhered to the GATT since 1947. Under its auspices we have exchanged tariff concessions with over 30 other countries. The full practical effect of many of the tariff reductions granted by other countries has been delayed as a result of the postwar financial disruption which caused many of these countries to limit their imports. However, during the last few years, as international financial conditions improved, numerous countries have abolished or enlarged quotas

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

or liberalized their licensing policies on a substantial number of import commodities. This, of course, has had the effect of bringing the lower rates granted us in these tariff negotiations more fully into play. As a result our exporters are now increasingly feeling the beneficial results of the past GATT negotiations.

I am convinced that the creation of the Otc would enable American industry and trade to derive additional and increased benefits from the GATT and the tariff concessions we have received. The agreement for the Otc has been so drafted that United States interests are fully safeguarded. Otc would not be supranational. It could not impose new obligations on the U.S. without our consent.

Administrative Machinery for GATT

This whole proposition is essentially very simple. The Otc would provide machinery to enable the GATT nations to do better those things which the GATT already provides for. It would not extend the GATT provisions to any additional aspects of trade, nor would the Otc take any new kinds of action on the aspects already covered by GATT. The new machinery to administer GATT is designed solely to enable the member nations to take more promptly and more effectively those joint actions already provided for in GATT, with respect to those tariff and trade matters already covered by GATT.

At present, with no formal administrative machinery those problems which require joint action by the GATT nations can be acted on only at long intervals, when the annual meetings are in session. In its present form the GATT might be likened to a club in which each member has important rights and benefits to which it is entitled, but which has no officers, standing committees, or staff empowered to carry on its business between annual membership meetings. It being the stated policy of this country to enter into reciprocal trade agreements, it is only common sense to provide machinery to administer agreements which are supposed to assure that each member actually receives equal benefits.

The countries whose interests are most frequently involved in the kinds of joint action which the Otc is designed to make more effective are naturally the ones which stand to gain the greatest benefits from better administration of the agree-

ment by Otc. I believe that the United States, by the nature of our position in foreign trade, stands to benefit as much as or more than any other single country from better administration of the GATT. For this reason the United States, above all, should welcome and encourage the creation of Otc.

U.S. Stakes in the Export Market

Let me spell this out by first reminding you that the United States has a very substantial stake in the export market. Last year, without considering at all the impact of foreign aid, United States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide range of products, in the total amount of approximately \$10 billion. This, of course, reflects the fact that we can and do compete successfully in markets throughout the world. But despite this fact many U.S. industries are confronted in many foreign markets with restrictions which continually limit the opportunities for the sale of U.S. products. In the absence of such restrictions, which include amongst other things quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions—in other words, under conditions of normal commercial competition—American manufacturers would have sold abroad even more than the \$10 billion figure just referred to. Our industries do not seek special governmental advantages in selling their products in foreign markets; they seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in foreign markets on the commercial merits of their products.

Now, by comparison, what does the GATT stand for? The GATT—the largest and most comprehensive trade agreement in history—is an agreement among 35 nations reflecting principles which have for good reason been cardinal points of U.S. trade policy. First of all, it contains for each member country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which that country agrees not to exceed in charging duties on imports from the remaining GATT countries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000 items, embracing a large share of world trade. The remainder of the agreement consists of a set of “general provisions” which each country agrees to observe in international trade. An important purpose of these general rules—which restrain the use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and administrative procedures—is to insure that these devices will not be used to nullify the intended value for members of the tariff-rate agreements.

Objectives of GATT

Under the GATT the 35 nations agree to seek four major objectives:

(1) Elimination of quota restrictions which arbitrarily limit the physical amount of goods which can be imported;

(2) Reliance on tariffs for the protection of domestic producers and avoidance of use of non-tariff measures for protective purposes;

(3) Avoidance of unjustified discrimination between outside nations in the administration of trade regulations; and

(4) Gradual reduction of unreasonable obstacles to the flow of trade.

So, in the last analysis, the objectives of the GATT closely correspond to established principles of American commercial policy—principles such as most-favored-nation treatment, for example, which the United States in its own interest has long urged upon other nations.

This is the long-run reason for my statement a moment ago that the United States stands to benefit as much or more than any other single country from better administration of the GATT. Furthermore, in the short run, large exporting countries with convertible currencies are the ones whose trade is most apt to be affected by special limitations adopted by countries having financial difficulties. Such large exporting countries, most importantly the United States, therefore have the greatest stake in any increase in the effectiveness with which their rights under GATT can be sustained.

The OTC would increase GATT's effectiveness by enabling the GATT countries to take joint action more promptly on problems arising under the agreement. From the standpoint of the United States, important matters which may require such action by GATT countries are cases of import restrictions and discriminatory quotas. The most important forms of this action are:

(1) Consulting with member governments to verify the justification for their action when they propose to restrict imports on the grounds that their balance of payments requires such limitations;

(2) Reviewing with such governments periodically the progress they are making to carry out their obligation to eliminate restrictive and discriminatory quotas as rapidly as their finances permit; and

(3) Handling complaints made by individual countries or groups of countries which believe that other members are not according their trade the treatment they have a right to. When American trade is directly affected in such cases, as it so frequently is, the promptness with which such matters can be taken up, the thoroughness with which they can be explored, and the dispatch with which remedies can be developed ultimately determine the degree of benefit our businessmen receive out of the GATT.

Cumbersome Administrative Procedures

Now, with no OTC, such problems can be taken up only under cumbersome administrative procedures. When a country having financial difficulty decides that it is necessary to impose or tighten restrictions on dollar imports, no full review of its justification for such action can be had until the next GATT meeting. This may be months away. The pressure of time in such a meeting, with a large agenda, makes thorough exploration of the justification for the action difficult, while the restrictions will in the interim have taken root and justifiable modification may be correspondingly more difficult.

Under the GATT, countries resorting to restrictions for financial reasons are called upon to eliminate these restrictions as rapidly as their finances permit. Effective procedures to insure this are of primary importance to the U.S. Periodic consultations are scheduled during which the membership collectively examines the current situation of each country still using such restrictions, and whether it is doing its best to abolish the remaining restrictions. Obviously, the issues in each case are very complex and to be really useful such examinations require thorough preparatory analyses and adequate time for the face-to-face consultation. For maximum results, adequate staff and organization facilities are necessary.

The same points broadly apply to the handling of complaints raised by countries which feel that their trade is not receiving the treatment to which it is entitled under the GATT. Remedial action which complaining countries should receive promptly is often postponed, while delay in exploring the merits of a complaint may impair the chances for constructive solution.

Naturally, we are not dependent in these matters solely on the formal GATT procedures. We

can and do pursue such matters bilaterally through regular diplomatic channels. Furthermore, we would expect to continue doing so even after the more effective machinery of the Organization for Trade Cooperation becomes available. But such bilateral negotiation frequently results in a stalemate. In many cases a divergence of opinion on the exact interpretation of rights under the agreement can be resolved only by consulting the judgment of all the parties to it.

Orc would improve this situation in a very simple way. It does not entail any complicated new procedures but it does make these procedures available on a continuous basis as problems arise. The Executive Committee would be available at any time to receive problems of this kind and to act on them without delay. Beyond that, Orc's staff would be able to provide more expeditious and thorough service in preparing technical material for the exploration of these cases.

Lest I be charged with claiming too much for this proposal, let me make it clear that I am not asserting the Orc is or could ever be the answer to all our trade problems. Such a test of perfection would seem to me an unfair basis on which to judge its value to the U.S. No one device can fairly be expected to solve all problems in a field as complex as international trade. However, I am convinced that the improvement which Orc would make in GATT's effectiveness would very substantially increase its value to the U.S.

I am aware that there has been disappointment in American circles with the results so far achieved by the GATT itself. For my own part I certainly agree that we have not to date accomplished as much as we should have liked to.

It does seem to me, however, that a mere demonstration that the GATT, with or without the Orc, falls short of a complete solution to all trade problems and that there are unfavorable situations which it has not completely cured, fails fully to meet the question which faces us. To me the significant question is not whether the GATT and the Orc can solve all of our problems. The question is rather whether, other things being equal, we are better off with them or without them. Our choice does not lie between the GATT and the Orc on the one hand and a world without problems on the other. The choice is rather between a world with many problems in which we have this useful device to help us solve them, and a world in which we face

these very same problems, but without their assistance.

The United States has benefited from those positive results which the general agreement has so far been able to achieve. The problems which the GATT has not fully solved would have been just as difficult if we had had no GATT at all. These problems were not created by GATT. The problems are there, GATT or no GATT.

A Cooperative International Approach

In my own mind, I have no doubt about the relative advantage to the United States of a cooperative international approach to trade problems versus unlimited national rivalry which could lead to international trade warfare. It seems clear to me that our net advantage lies in having such an agreement and working constantly to improve its operation. That is precisely what the Orc is designed to do.

The Orc would be essentially administrative and entail no abridgement of our rights in conducting our own affairs.

It could not add to our obligations under the GATT and could not limit the powers of the Congress with respect to our tariffs.

It could not make tariff concessions or in any way modify the United States tariff structure.

It could not impose new obligations on the United States without our consent.

We are assured a permanent seat on the Executive Committee.

Its major function would be to administer more effectively an agreement to which the United States has for 9 years been a party.

That agreement, in turn, projects in the international arena trade-policy objectives with which the United States has long been associated.

In conclusion, I assert that we cannot lose by cooperating with our friends in the trade area of our foreign relations, just as we cooperate with them in a variety of other directions.

We cannot stand at arm's length from them in this field and hope to meet the unanimity of action produced by the Soviet bloc.

The reciprocal-trade-agreements program is an established part of our national policy. Under it, our participation in a 35-nation agreement offers us an opportunity to obtain the maximum tariff benefits from the countries concerned.

Having this policy, it is clearly in our interest to provide the machinery—Orc—which is needed to make these agreements as effective as possible.

The proposal to establish the Orc involves no

issues as to our tariff level. This issue is settled by our own domestic trade-agreements legislation, our escape-clause and peril-point provisions, and the other limits and safeguards it provides.

Importance of the U.N. Specialized Agencies to the United Nations

Statement by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

I welcome this opportunity to assist your committee in exploring United States participation in the 10 specialized agencies of the United Nations. You have chosen for your inquiry one of the significant elements in the international scene today. The cooperative activity represented by these international agencies must be taken into account in any assessment of world political affairs as well as any overall survey of world economic and social growth.

In fact, relatively few people realize the importance of the specialized agencies. They lack the glamour and the drama of the General Assembly or the Security Council. While the political debates in New York make headlines, the specialized agencies are engaged in the relatively humdrum job of solving fundamental problems in economic, technical, and social fields.

Actually, the specialized agencies have achieved the greatest degree of international cooperation the world has seen, largely because they deal with immediate human problems—problems which technicians can solve if they are given the opportunity. And most people these days are inclined to give their technicians greater freedom than they permit their statesmen.

One has only to look at the fields of activity covered by the specialized agencies to realize their importance—food, aviation, health, to name only a few. And that importance grows when one takes account of the many services they provide, services which it would be difficult and costly to

obtain through any other means. But finally, and from the point of view of our national interest and our own foreign policy, the specialized agencies assume great significance as channels through which we can meet the Soviet challenge. The channels are, in effect, of our own choosing and ones in which we can, so to speak, put our best foot forward. I will have more to say on this point later in my statement.

It seemed to us that we could be most helpful to the committee at the outset by focusing this general statement on an overall look at the specialized agencies from the point of view of our foreign policy. With that as the general approach, I will restrict my remarks to three main areas: first, the historical background or perspective; second, the facts regarding the place the agencies hold in the total international picture; and third, an evaluation as to the importance of the agencies in international politics and as one of the means through which we express our foreign policy.

Historical Perspective

Our judgments today may need the benefit of some historical perspective. How and why did we arrive at this present stage of development in international organizations? Two facts are well known but need reemphasis. Organized discussion and cooperation between sovereign nations have a long history. Events since the Second World War have simply elaborated the structure. Secondly, the agencies with which we are concerned here are *not* “Johnny-come-lately’s,” which owe their form and existence merely to the special circumstances of the recent war and to the emer-

¹Made on Feb. 20 before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

gence of this Nation and the Soviet Union as dominant world powers.

The fact is, rather, as the subcommittee knows, that the present United Nations system was not created overnight as a result of enthusiasm generated by the Second World War. On the contrary, the United Nations and the 10 specialized agencies have their roots in the past. The charter of the United Nations was developed in part out of the experience of the League of Nations, the World Court, and other international institutions of previous decades. Several of the specialized agencies have their origins back in the 19th century. In 1865, for example, the International Telegraphic Union was established; today, this organization is known as the International Telecommunication Union. In 1874 the Universal Postal Union was formed to bring order out of the chaos that then existed among the postal services of individual governments. And chaos it was, for there were no uniform postal rates in force in the world at that time. Foreign rates were very high and the sending of mail through different countries was an exceedingly complicated matter. An individual in the United States mailing a letter to Australia found he must pay either 5 cents, 33 cents, 45 cents, 60 cents, or \$1.02 per half ounce, depending on the route by which it was sent. In 1878 there was established the International Meteorological Organization, which today is known as the World Meteorological Organization.

Several of the other specialized agencies have their origins in the early part of the 20th century. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations developed out of the International Institute of Agriculture, founded at Rome in 1905. The World Health Organization grew out of the International Office of Public Health, which was established at Paris in 1909. Later, in 1919, came the International Labor Organization. Only four of the present specialized agencies were new creations during or after the Second World War: the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

At the San Francisco conference in 1945, special attention was paid to the problem of what to do with this complex network of international agencies, old and new. There were two different schools of thought. One school argued in favor of complete centralization in order to provide for a maxi-

mum degree of coordination. This school of thought maintained that, if all activities—political, security, economic, social, and the rest—could be placed under one roof, there would be relatively little waste of money and manpower. They favored a single institution which, like a national government, would consist of a number of functional departments and be financed out of a single budget. The other school of thought argued in favor of decentralization, insisting that the United Nations should be limited primarily to political and security matters and that the specialized agencies, as autonomous bodies, should deal with all the other activities. They contended that no single institution could cope effectively with the whole range of international problems and that, in any case, the success of these humanitarian activities should not be jeopardized by being tied in to political issues.

Facts About the United Nations Today

The present system, which includes the United Nations and the 10 specialized agencies, combines the advantages of both of these schools of thought. Each organization has its own constitution, its own secretariat, its own rules of procedure, its own membership, and its own budget. All of these organizations, however, are bound together in a common effort by agreements between the United Nations and each agency as well as agreements between the agencies themselves. The General Assembly of the United Nations reviews the administrative budgets of the 10 specialized agencies, and the Economic and Social Council makes recommendations for coordination of their programs. The Council has accomplished much in the past 10 years in suggesting priorities for activities, in urging a concentration of effort, and in eliminating duplication among the various agencies. Furthermore, the heads of the several organizations meet together regularly in the Administrative Coordination Committee, which is under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the U.N. Here they discuss their common problems, plan joint programs, and strive to eliminate overlapping and duplication.

Country membership in these agencies varies from 54 to 96; seven of the organizations have more than 70 members. The central servicing staffs, employed under the authority of the member nations, total approximately 5,000 persons.

The budgets of the agencies for this calendar

year vary from around \$400,000 for the World Meteorological Organization to about \$12 million for the World Health Organization, figures which I consider modest in relation to the problems with which the agencies deal. We and other member nations are constantly alert to the budget question and have exerted every effort to keep the totals reasonable in the light of what governments can contribute and of what it is practicable for the organization to undertake. Let me illustrate this. The first 5 years after the war was a formative period. The total expenditures of specialized agencies which resulted in assessments on members ranged from \$18.7 million in 1947 to about \$30 million in 1951, the first year in which all were in existence in their present form and fully operative. In 1955, 4 years later, the comparable total was only approximately \$38 million. A significant part of that increase was necessary merely to meet price changes and other increased operating costs.

Sovereignty

From time to time, Mr. Chairman, charges are made that the United Nations is a kind of super-state that concludes treaties that are binding upon the United States and are gradually undermining our national sovereignty. These charges, of course, are totally false.

Let me emphasize that no one of these organizations, nor the whole system taken together, constitutes any kind of a "world government." Nor do they represent, in any way, a threat to our sovereignty. None of these organizations can enact legislation, levy taxes, raise armies, or enforce laws. To be sure, each conference or assembly of an agency can take decisions about the structure and functioning of its secretariat and can assess member governments for annual dues. On the other hand, any member government that has serious objections to these arrangements can always, as a last resort, withdraw.

Likewise, each agency can draft and *approve* treaties and conventions on particular subjects, if the member states want to do so, but these are *binding* only upon those governments which subsequently take their own constitutional steps to accept them. In our case, this means approval by the United States Senate. The ILO, for example, has concluded 104 conventions, although the United States is a party to only 5 actually in force. The WHO can issue quarantine regulations—a highly useful function—but these are not binding

on any government that specifically rejects them. Thus, what we are considering here is a group of voluntary associations in which sovereign governments pool a little of their money and their energy to attain common goals.

Importance of the Agencies in International Affairs

When the United Nations held its commemorative ceremony at San Francisco last June to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the charter, the representatives of all its members reviewed the achievements of the past and looked forward to the future. To me, the most impressive aspect of this 10th anniversary was the fact that practically everybody now takes the United Nations for granted. Our Government, the Soviet Government, and dozens of other governments today take for granted that they will submit many of their most important problems to the United Nations for debate and that they will work together within the United Nations toward a solution of these problems. In the same way, the members of the 10 specialized agencies have long since come to take for granted their responsibility to deal with common problems, in their respective fields, to better the lot of man.

Nonetheless, of course, we in the Department of State, as well as the staffs of other Government agencies, look critically at all proposals for action by the specialized agencies, proposals which we, as a sovereign government, are called upon to discuss with the other members of these agencies. As a result of this critical review, we have come to recognize three basic reasons for the very important role which these agencies are playing in international affairs today.

First, handling the complex matters which arise in diplomatic relations today solely on a bilateral basis is much too expensive and much too slow—both for the powerful and for the weak.

Second, meeting the rising expectations and demands of the rapidly developing peoples—and, in fact, the demands of our own expanding economy—requires the practical techniques of multilateral negotiation and agreement afforded by the specialized agencies.

Finally, as the President said in his recent state of the Union message,² we must wage the peace with all the tools and ideas and means at hand. The specialized agencies offer very effective machinery for this effort.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

Fields of Activity

These basic factors serve to underline the importance of three traditional types of work of international organizations, particularly the specialized agencies. Even if there were no great problems of poverty in some parts of the world, if there were no problems of restrictions on the movements of goods, ideas, and people, we would still need convenient international forums (a) for consultation, (b) for provision of services, and (c) for the exchange of information. The complex problems of the modern world seldom involve only two nations. As I mentioned previously, the fact is that *all* countries, the comparatively advanced as well as the rapidly developing, frequently find it easier to deal with each other at a multilateral level.

Let me illustrate these points with practical examples from the work of the specialized agencies—and show at the same time how our national interest is served.

First, one group of these agencies is engaged primarily in establishing common standards and providing common services for their members. The URT helps get our letters and packages across national boundaries at reasonable rates. The IRT helps keep the air waves free for our radio broadcasts and in several practical ways facilitates international communications. The WMO helps to collect worldwide information of great value to our own Weather Bureau. The ICAO safeguards American air traffic by developing uniform standards and procedures throughout the world. The International Monetary Fund, by seeking to stabilize currencies, facilitates our foreign investments and trade. These essential activities are obviously of very direct advantage to the United States.

Second, other agencies devote special attention to promoting economic and social development. The ILO, by promoting higher standards of labor everywhere, helps to protect the American worker against cheap or even slave labor in other countries. The WHO, by determining which drugs on the international market produce addiction, provides protection against the traffic in narcotics. The FAO, by developing a Convention on Plant Protection³ and carrying on related activities, has helped to safeguard American agriculture

against pests and diseases from other lands. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, by developing an International Copyright Convention, protects in foreign countries the interests of American writers, artists, and musicians. And the International Bank, by financing sound developments in underdeveloped countries, creates new opportunities for private American capital. These are only a few of the examples I could mention which are of direct benefit to the American people.

Third, most of these agencies are engaged in collecting, analyzing, and publishing information. This activity is of inestimable value not only to governments but also to businessmen and other private citizens throughout the world. It is an activity that no one government could possibly do by itself, even if it wished to spend the necessary money and manpower. The handbooks, the yearbooks, the periodicals of the specialized agencies contain facts and figures and analyses of those facts and figures that are among the major contributions of these organizations. This activity does not make the front pages of our newspapers, but it is one that is familiar to technicians in many different fields throughout our country.

More recently there has emerged a fourth basic and important program to make the work of these agencies more effective. This is the expanded technical assistance program. As the committee knows, the United Nations and the specialized agencies found that they could not provide sufficiently, out of their regular budgets, the technical assistance and advisory services required by their member governments. The needs of the underdeveloped countries were so urgent and their governments were so insistent on speedier progress that a special program, financed out of voluntary contributions, was established. This expanded technical assistance program has injected new life into the work of many of these agencies and has contributed notably to the economic and social advancement of many countries in Latin America, the Near East, and Asia.

This is the essentially new element in international organization activity since the Second World War. It has enabled the international agencies to provide help rapidly where it is needed. These agencies have in a sense gotten to the grass-roots. They are showing how things can be done better with available resources. They are teaching the ordinary man on farms and in villages and

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 311.

in the factories. They are thus bringing the meaning of the United Nations close to the people.

The best test of the success of the whole United Nations system is this: Over the past decade, with only a few exceptions, the original members have not withdrawn or threatened to withdraw from the United Nations or the specialized agencies. On the contrary, many other governments have applied for memberships in these organizations. Almost the first thing the government of a new state does after the achievement of its independence is to join a number of these organizations.

Later in these hearings, expert witnesses from the State Department and other departments will provide you with detailed information about the work programs and accomplishments of each of the specialized agencies. They will be much better qualified than I to answer your questions about labor productivity, fundamental education, currency stabilization, forest conservation, and other technical matters. They will give proof, if any be needed, that these specialized agencies are not mere debating societies; that they are, on the contrary, well-tested machines for getting things done; that the people behind them are practical and get practical results.

A summary of these functions demonstrates, I believe, that the dynamics of the world today, even were there no threat to a peaceful future, call for voluntary, cooperative effort through the specialized agencies.

The U.S. Stake in the Specialized Agencies

I do not need to go into details with this subcommittee, I am sure, to demonstrate that poor countries are poor customers of the United States. People whose average daily food consumption level is only 1,800 calories (in contrast to about 3,300 for North America) and whose annual income is less than \$100 or \$200 are not in a position to buy many United States farm products such as rice, cotton, and wheat. Conversely, prosperous countries are likely to be our best customers. Two of the most highly developed countries in the world, the United Kingdom and Canada, both of which produce many of the same products we do, lead all other countries as markets for United States exports. On the other hand, many other countries, equally large in territory and larger in populations but far below the United Kingdom and Canada in per capita income, rank far below them in pur-

chase of United States exports, except as they are enabled to pay for these goods through United States assistance. It stands to reason, therefore, that if the per capita income of those countries could be raised even a little, they might become much better permanent customers for the output of American farms, factories, and mines, and they might eventually require less United States assistance. Raising the standard of living of these countries is one of the major objectives of the specialized agencies.

And now, given the increasingly aggressive economic threat of the Soviet Union, participation in these international agencies becomes important to us for still other reasons. These reasons strike me as worth emphasis.

First of all, the United States finds in the specialized agencies an opportunity to exercise its leadership, to develop a sense of unity among the nations of the free world, to demonstrate American ingenuity in putting knowledge to the service of mankind, and, by all these means, to gain good will and prestige. Second, to the extent that these agencies contribute to relieve tensions, to reduce poverty, disease, and illiteracy, and to raise standards of living, to this extent their work contributes measurably to the efforts of our Government to combat the threat of communism throughout the world. And finally, to the extent that these agencies help their member governments to develop the habit of cooperation and the routine of working together toward our common goals, to this extent these agencies are helping to lay foundations for a peaceful world.

Our vigorous participation in the United Nations agencies is particularly helpful in a world where the underdeveloped countries are striving for recognition, for freedom from any sort of domination, and for mastery over their own materials and human resources. It is evidence to these countries that we are ready to take our part as one of many in the working out of common problems without fear or reservation in the free exchange of ideas, and in laying a share of our great resources on the table for the common good.

These reasons would be compelling even if the Soviet Union withdrew from all the specialized agencies.

But the Soviet Union now appears determined to bring its aggressive challenge into these forums. At the end of the last session of the United Nations

General Assembly, the United States delegation sent to Secretary Dulles a statement * that read, in part, as follows:

The present period in history may one day be recognized as a major turning point in the struggle between Communism and freedom. It appears to be clearly a shift in the cold war, in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront.

Throughout the Near East and Asia, even in Latin America, we see this new shift under way. Not only is the Soviet Union now offering economic aid and technical assistance but it is also suddenly becoming the self-announced champion of economic and social development in the United Nations and the specialized agencies. All this represents no change whatever in the basic strategy of the Soviet leaders, but it does represent a dramatic shift in tactics. Moreover, this indicates that the Soviet leaders have come to recognize the significance of these organizations and the value of their work.

This means that our form of society and government meets that of the Soviets in open and observable competition in the forums of the specialized agencies—where all the world can see. The people of the world are watching our reaction to this new challenge.

I am sure that members of the subcommittee are especially interested in precisely what the participation of the Soviet Union and its satellites in these various organizations means for the United States. Some Members of the Congress may feel deeply concerned about this development, and they may even wonder whether it is worth while for the United States to continue membership in international organizations where the Soviets promote their propaganda and do their utmost to weaken the free world.

Let me mention, at the outset, that there is no uniform pattern of participation by the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union itself belongs to some of the specialized agencies, and the various satellites belong to one or another of them. The Soviet Union has never belonged to FAO, ICAO, the Bank, and the Fund, but it has recently joined the ILO and UNESCO and has announced its return to the WHO. However, the maximum number of votes the entire Soviet bloc can muster in any international organization is only nine, a relatively small minority.

* *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

The harmful effects of Soviet propaganda in the United Nations and the specialized agencies have often been discussed in Congress, in the press, and elsewhere. I must say that this aspect of the problem worries me least of all. In fact, I feel strongly that it is greatly to our advantage to be able to meet Soviet propaganda head-on in the United Nations and in these other agencies. Our spokesmen, whether from the Government or from private life, whether Democrats or Republicans, can hold their own against any propaganda agents of the Soviet Union. Our representatives can expose the falseness of the Soviet propaganda and can show, by facts and figures, what is happening behind the Iron Curtain. At the same time they can explain the American way of life and show the rest of the world what can be accomplished under our tradition of democracy and free enterprise.

Indeed, one of the most important contributions of the United Nations lies precisely here; for in the debates that have taken place in the United Nations and in the specialized agencies, the diabolical nature of international communism has been clearly revealed. As a result, the free-world countries, by consistently overwhelming margins, have been able to outvote the Soviet bloc on all important issues.

The return of the Soviet Union to the International Labor Organization has created a special problem, with which members of the subcommittee may already be familiar. The International Labor Organization has a unique structure in that each member is represented by separate delegates for its government, its employers, and its workers. This system is a useful one so far as democratic countries are concerned, but it raises serious questions where totalitarian governments are involved. To what extent, in other words, are the Soviet employers and the Soviet workers represented by independent delegates free from government domination and control?

In fact, of course, we know that the so-called worker and management delegates speak for the Soviet Government. What this means for the ILO and what can be done about the situation is now under study by a small group within the ILO framework. Many will be impatient about the slow process of developing a solution and of securing agreement from other governments on a proper course of action. Meanwhile, we have even heard

proposals that the United States withdraw from the organization.

It is my firm conviction that it serves our national interest to remain and to continue our full participation. In the first place, there are important economic considerations. ILO efforts to encourage and actually to assist in the introduction of improved labor standards help to reduce the gap between our high standards and those that exist elsewhere.

But even more important, perhaps, is the fact that the ILO can and does play a significant part in our efforts to keep the free world free. We have already demonstrated that by our success in encouraging the ILO to produce a report on forced labor in the Soviet Union and its satellite states.⁵ Furthermore, with direct employer and worker participation in the ILO, particularly from the developing and uncommitted countries, U. S. business and labor representatives have an unusual opportunity to come into direct contact with their counterparts from other lands. Through this contact, they can contribute to a wider and more sympathetic understanding of our form of capitalism, of our economic and social institutions which are so misrepresented by the Communists, and of the benefits of a system where free men work together for an expanding economy.

We cannot afford to renounce our leadership by retreating before this challenge. It would be nothing short of folly to encourage, by default, the Soviet Union's desperate efforts to win the minds of men to their cause.

Need for Continued U.S. Participation

From the point of view of our foreign policy and our national interest, then, we find most of the nations of the world engaged in this impressive structure of international organizations to consider and act upon important economic, technical, and social problems of today. The cost is infinitesimal in comparison with the magnitude of the problems.

The organizations involved have impressive accomplishments to their credit.

There is no move to withdraw on the part of the other participants.

Even without the challenge and new tactics of the Soviets, therefore, it seems to us only a logical and essential exercise of our sovereignty and lead-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1953, p. 167.

ership to continue and strengthen our participation in the specialized agencies.

In praising the work of the specialized agencies, I would not want to leave the impression that they are perfect. No human institution is perfect, and the specialized agencies have their share of imperfections. Some secretariats are not as efficient as we might wish. Sometimes there is duplication of effort or an element of friction between two of the agencies, or between one of them and the United Nations itself. On occasion, an agency may try to carry on too many different activities at the same time, to hold too many meetings, and to publish too many documents, thus tending to scatter its efforts and diffuse its resources.

On balance, however, despite some of these inevitable imperfections, our Government can endorse the work of the specialized agencies and can commend the devotion and diligence of their secretariats.

In closing, I would like to quote a statement of Laird Bell, distinguished lawyer and chairman of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. Mr. Bell was one of our delegates at the last General Assembly. Speaking of U.N. technical and agricultural assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America, he said: "I doubt that any dollars we spend are better spent than on that assistance. My own feeling is that it is justification enough for the United Nations."

Mr. Stassen To Represent U.S. at London Disarmament Meetings

Press release 121 dated March 8

Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President, will represent the United States at the forthcoming meetings of the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It is expected that these meetings will commence in London on March 19, 1956.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1952 and is concerned with preparing proposals on all aspects of the regulation of armed forces and armaments, including nuclear weapons. The Commission is composed of the 11 members of the United Nations Security Council, and Canada. In 1953, on recommendation of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission set up a Subcommittee of Five—Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics—to seek in private an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem. This subcommittee met in London early in 1955 and again in New York later that year. It has now been reconvened to continue its efforts.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources

The Department of State announced on March 9 (press release 132) that Assistant Secretary Holland will be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, which opens in Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, on March 15. Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, will be vice chairman of the delegation.

The full delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Vice Chairman

John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States

Delegates

William C. Herrington, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of State

Ralph L. Miller, Chief of the Fuels Division, U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

William Sanders, U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Council of Jurists

Advisers

James E. Barr, Executive Secretary, Shrimp Association of America

Stanley L. Back, Lt. (jg.), Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy

Wilbert McL. Chapman, Director of Research, American Tuna Boat Association

Robert E. Hardwicke, American Petroleum Institute

Rear Admiral Harold A. Houser, USN, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy

Milton J. Lindner, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, México, D.F.

John Lyman, Chief, Division of Oceanography, Hydrographic Office, Department of the Navy

Oscar E. Sette, Office of Oceanic Research, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Arnie J. Suomela, Assistant Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Fred E. Taylor, Office of Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of State

Edwin Thomasson, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Secretary of Delegation

Henry Allen, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

Technical Secretary

William G. Bowdler, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

The meeting was called pursuant to a resolution of the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March 1954, for the purpose of studying various juridical, economic, and scientific problems related to the continental shelf and ocean waters of the Western Hemisphere.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs Tariff

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), creating an international union for the publication of customs tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.¹

Accession deposited: Iceland, February 17, 1956.

BILATERAL

Denmark

Agreement amending the agreement of August 23, 1951 (TIAS 2324), to finance certain educational exchange programs, by establishing a United States Educational Foundation in Denmark and providing additional funds for the program. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen February 13 and 17, 1956. Entered into force February 17, 1956.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of

¹ Not in force for the United States.

1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Djakarta March 2, 1956. Entered into force March 2, 1956.

Japan

Agreement on agricultural commodities, agreed official minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

Protocol to amend article III of the agreement on agricultural commodities signed May 31, 1955 (TIAS 3284). Signed at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the protocol in accordance with its legal procedures.

Agreement relating to grants to Japan, under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454), to expand school children's welfare programs in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Entered into force February 10, 1956.

Agreement relating to grants of agricultural commodities to Japan for an expanded school lunch program in accordance with the agreement on agricultural commodities of May 31, 1955 (TIAS 3284), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 10, 1956. Will enter into force on the date of receipt of a note from the Government of Japan stating that the implementation of the present agreement can be initiated on the part of Japan.

Pakistan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Karachi March 2, 1956. Entered into force March 2, 1956.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Staff Corps Review Panels

The Department of State announced on March 6 (press release 116) that the Seventh Staff Corps Review Panels had been convened that day by Raymond A. Hare, Director General of the Foreign Service, in the presence of other high officials of the Department. These five panels of four members each will sit for about 2 months to review the records of some 2,500 members of the Foreign Service Staff Corps in order to recommend certain personnel for promotion and to make other recommendations such as naming those who should be given special training.

The Staff Corps furnishes the personnel to provide administrative and technical support to our diplomatic and consular establishments through-

out the world. Its members are promoted on a basis of a review of their performance records as built up in Washington. Panels to make this competitive review are chosen from among outstanding members of the Staff Corps itself, other officers of the Foreign Service, and officials of the Departments of Commerce and of Labor, which are represented abroad by the Foreign Service.¹

Confirmations

The Senate on March 7 confirmed Fletcher Warren to be Ambassador to Turkey.

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmations

The Senate on March 7 confirmed Robert C. Hill to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Designations

Robert G. Barnes as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs, effective March 12.

Fisher Howe as Director of the Executive Secretariat, effective March 12.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Economic Cooperation. TIAS 3139. Pub. 5817. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens October 14, 1952, and December 2, 1953. Entered into force December 2, 1953.

¹For a list of the members of the panels, see press release 116.

Army Mission to Liberia. TIAS 3140. Pub. 5794. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Liberia—Extending agreement of January 11, 1951. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington August 7 and October 23, 1953. Entered into force October 23, 1953.

Exchange of Official Publications. TIAS 3141. Pub. 5998. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan—Amending agreement of April 25 and May 23, 1951. Exchange of notes—Dated at Karachi April 22 and December 29, 1953. Entered into force December 29, 1953.

Economic Cooperation—Release of Counterpart Funds. TIAS 3142. Pub. 5930. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States and Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade April 16, 1954. Entered into force April 16, 1954.

Army Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 3144. Pub. 5795. 25 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador September 23, 1954. Entered into force November 17, 1954.

Naval, Army, and Air Force Missions to Colombia. TIAS 3146. Pub. 5803. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia—Extending agreements of October 14, 1946, and February 21, 1949. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 6 and November 4, 1954. Entered into force November 4, 1954.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 3147. Pub. 5897. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Lebanon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Beirut March 6 and 23, 1953. Entered into force March 23, 1953.

American Commission for Cultural Exchange With Italy—Educational Exchange Programs. TIAS 3148. Pub. 5819. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Interim amendment of agreement of December 18, 1948. Exchange of notes—Dated at Rome April 28, June 14 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

Technical Cooperation Program for Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. TIAS 3150. Pub. 5821. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Signed at Rome June 28, 1954. Entered into force June 28, 1954.

Technical Cooperation—Program in British Guiana. TIAS 3152. Pub. 5823. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 29 and July 12, 1954. Entered into force July 12, 1954.

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. TIAS 3158. Pub. 5837. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Denmark. Exchange of notes—Signed at Copenhagen December 15, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1954.

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Austrian State Treaty. TIAS 3298. Pub. 6016. 167 pp. 60¢.

Between the United States and other governments—Signed at Vienna May 15, 1955. Entered into force July 27, 1955.

Copyright. TIAS 3324. Pub. 6004. 98 pp. 30¢.

Convention and protocols between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force December 6, 1954 and September 16, 1955.

Trade. TIAS 3348. Pub. 6093. 49 pp. 20¢.

Agreement and protocol, with annexes and exchange of notes, between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Revising agreement of July 4, 1946—Signed at Washington September 6, 1955. Entered into force January 1, 1956.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3359. Pub. 6115. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland amending agreement of June 15, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 20 and November 3, 1955.

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Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila October 28, 1955.

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Protocol between the United States and the Netherlands—Supplementing convention of April 29, 1948—Signed at Washington June 15, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income, Extension to Netherlands Antilles of Operation of Convention of April 29, 1948, as Supplemented. TIAS 3367. Pub. 6139. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington June 24 and August 7, 1952, September 15 and November 4 and 10, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955; operative retroactively January 1, 1955.

Military Assistance Advisory Group. TIAS 3377. Pub. 6152. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima June 28, July 18, October 20 and 28, 1955. Entered into force October 26, 1955.

Weather Stations—Betio Island. TIAS 3389. Pub. 6155. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 15, 1955. Entered into force November 15, 1955.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3400. Pub. 6176. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 14 and 18, and November 18, 1955. Entered into force November 18, 1955.

Economic Cooperation—Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 3402. Pub. 6182. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon October 11 and November 3, 1955. Entered into force November 3, 1955.

Sale and Purchase of Tin Concentrates. TIAS 3413. Pub. 6013. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Thailand—Signed at Bangkok November 14, 1955. Entered into force November 14, 1955; operative retroactively November 1, 1955.

Exchange of Commodities and Sale of Grain. TIAS 3414. Pub. 6184. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Turkey—Modifying agreement of April 28, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 6 and November 18, 1955. Entered into force November 18, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3422. Pub. 6203. 4 pp. 5¢.

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Fisheries Mission to El Salvador. TIAS 3423. Pub. 6207. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Extending agreement of July 19, 1951, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador September 13, 1954, and July 25, 1955. Entered into force July 25, 1955; operative retroactively August 19, 1954.

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Technical Cooperation, Rural Education Program. TIAS 3153. Pub. 5832. 25 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil giving effect to administrative clauses of program agreement of June 27, 1952, between Brazil and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 14 and 30, 1954. Entered into force June 30, 1954.

Lend Lease Settlement, Return of Certain United States Naval Vessels. TIAS 3168. Pub. 5843. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Signed at Washington December 22, 1954. Entered into force December 22, 1954.

Technical Cooperation, Employment Service Program. TIAS 3169. Pub. 5844. 20 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima December 31, 1954. Entered into force December 31, 1954.

Passport Visa Fees. TIAS 3172. Pub. 5845. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein. Exchanges of notes—Dated at Washington October 22 and 31 and November 4 and 13, 1947. Entered into force November 13, 1947.

Defense, Offshore Procurement Program. TIAS 3173. Pub. 5846. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece. Exchange of notes—Dated at Athens October 14 and November 12, 1954. Entered into force November 12, 1954.

North Atlantic Treaty, Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands. TIAS 3174. Pub. 5847. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Signed at The Hague August 13, 1954. Entered into force November 16, 1954.

Mutual Security, Defense Support Assistance. TIAS 3183. Pub. 5864. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi January 11, 1955. Entered into force January 11, 1955.

March 19, 1956

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 5-11

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Press releases issued prior to March 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 107 of March 1 and 111 of March 2.

No.	Date	Subject
113	3/6	Highlights of refugee relief report.
114	3/6	Iron lungs sent to Argentina.
115	3/6	Comment on Chinese Communist statement of March 4.
116	3/6	Staff corps review panels (rewrite).
117	3/7	French-Moroccan declaration.
118	3/7	Message to French on French-Moroccan declaration.
119	3/7	Message to Sultan of Morocco.
*120	3/8	Mrs. Houghton appointed to UNESCO Commission.
121	3/8	Meetings of U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee.
122	3/8	Program for Costello visit (rewrite).
123	3/8	Barnes appointment (rewrite).
124	3/8	Howe appointment (rewrite).
125	3/8	Dulles: statement at final SEATO session.
†127	3/9	Wilcox: "The Soviet Challenge and the U.N."
*128	3/9	Patterson nominated Ambassador to Uruguay.
130	3/9	SEATO Council communique.
*131	3/9	McIntosh nominated Ambassador to Venezuela.
132	3/9	Delegation to continental shelf conference.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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